The Yogācāra-mādhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins of the Yogācāra School.


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1. ABBREVIATIONS

AAPV : Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā of Haribhadra.

BCAP : Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā of Prajñākaramati, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, BST, No. 12.

BhK : Bhavanākrama of Kamalaśila, Minor Buddhist Texts part I & II, ed. by G. Tucci 1798 Rinsen Book Company Kyoto.

BhK II : Bkāvanākrama, ch. II. P. Vol. 102, D. No. 3916.


Bibl. Ind. : Bibliotheca Indica.

BST : Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga.

C : The Cone edition, U. S. A., IASWR.

D : The sDe dge edition, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, ed. by Hayashima, Takasaki, Yamaguchi, and Ejima.

HOS : HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES, ed by Daniel H. H. Ingalls.

JIBS : Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū), Tokyo.

LAS : Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra, ed. by Bunyu Nanjo.


 MMK : Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna, Bibl. Bud. IV.

 N : The sNar-thaṅ edition, preserved at Kyoto University and Toyobunko.

 NB : Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti.

 om : The edition omits the letter or the word.


 PV : Pramāṇavārtika-kārikā of Dharmakīrti.

 SDK : Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā of Jñānagarbha, (D. No. 3881 Sa 1b¹–3b³).


 SOR : Serie Orientale Roma.
2. INTRODUCTION

§ 1. KAMALASILA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW.

Buddhist epistemological theory, which was formalized by Dignāgā (circa A. D. 480–540) and significantly advanced by Dharmakīrti (c. A. D. 600–660), is closely related to Buddhist logic. Some scholars have therefore called this the school of Buddhist logicians. Śāntarakṣita (c.

(1) Concerning this date see Massaki Hattori. Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, HOS. 47. (1967), EDITOR'S FOREWORD. p. V.


A. D. 725–788), his disciple Kamalaśīla (c. A. D. 740–795) and Haribhadra (c. A. D. 800) are now known as the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school. They were not only greatly influenced by Buddhist logic, but they also tried to apply it to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva).

During their period the Buddhist philosophical systems, such as those of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika, had already arrived at their highest point, and at the same time, Buddhist logic was also flourishing. In these circumstances, even within Buddhists schools themselves, heated debates were common. Thus the formalism developed by Dignāga and then Dharmakīrti for judging the validity of a proposition

the two valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) by direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa) was employed in deciding such theoretical disputes by the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school.

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(5) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yūichi, *Chūgan Shisō no Rekishi to Bunkō* 中観思想の歴史と文献 (History and Bibliography of Philosophy of Mādhyamika), Kōza Daijō Bukkyō No. 7 (Nov. 1982), Chūgan Shisō 講座・大乘仏教 7 中観思想. p. 21. Cf. Note 3.

Śāntarakṣita and his followers were therefore in the position to prove the proposition that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (ṇihṣva-abhāva) through the use of these two valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). In other words, had this logical procedure been disregarded, the proposition that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (ṇihṣvabhāva) could not be shown. In this sense, we can understand them as philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school who were put in a position to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (ṇihṣvabhāva) according to the formalism of logical examination. However, even though they adopted Buddhist logic to prove their philosophy, this does not mean that they endorsed completely the philosophy and logic of Dharma-kīrti, since, in the end, they refute this view from the standpoint of highest truth of the Mādhyamika. Their obligation was to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (ṇihṣvabhāva) and, at the same time, to show that there are good grounds for refuting the various views of the other schools which were influential at the time. Accordingly, it was to these purposes that Kamalaśīla wrote his Madhyamakāloka-nāma (Māl) and Sarvadharmanīṣvabhāva-siddhi (SDNS) which consist of debates between the Yogācāra-mādhyamika and other schools of Buddhism, the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, and the Yogācāra, on the subject of whether or not all things have intrinsic nature (svabhāva).

It is obvious that Kamalaśīla’s philosophy was greatly influenced by his teacher Śāntarakṣita who wrote such works as the Madhyamakāla-

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(7) SDNS (1), (2).
(8) Yūichi Kajima. Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Practice. ed. by M. Kiyota, (Honolulu :
ikkara-kārika (MAK), Madhyamakālaṁkāra-vṛtti (MAV) and Tattva-
saṁgraha (TS), since he wrote the Madhyamakālaṁkāra-paṇiikā (MAP) and
Tattvasaṁgraha-paṇijikā (TSP) as a commentary on these texts.

It is this logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature
(niḥsvabhāva) and the logical refutation of the views of the other
schools in portions of Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka Prajñāpā-
ramitāvyākhyā (AAPV) that were written on the bases of Śāntarakṣīta’s
MAK and MAV and Kamalaśīla’s MAP, Māl and SDNS, which are
parallel to Haribhadra’s work.

It should thus be pointed out that the following translation of Harib-
hadra’s AAPV shares much in common with the MAK, MAV, MAP,
and Māl, which I have indicated in my notes to the translation.

§ 2. HARIBHADRA’S ABHISAMAYĀLAṀKĀRĀLOKĀ PRAJÑ-
ĀPĀRAMITĀVYĀKHYĀ (AAPV)

The AAPV was written, of course, as a commentary on the Aṣṭāsa-
hasrikā-prajñāpāramita, according to the Abhisamayālaṁkāra of Maitre-
ya. In this respect the design of the AAPV differs from such works as
the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣīta, which were written with the
purpose of demonstrating his own philosophical position as a Yogācāra-
mādhyamika.

This is true also for Kamalaśīla’s commentary (MAP) on Śāntarakṣī-

Ichigō Masamichi 一郷正道.
“Chūgān–Shōgonron–chū” no Wayakuenkyu (1) 『中観荘厳論集』の和訳研究 (1)
(Japanese translation of MAV). Kyōtosangyōdaiqaku Ronshū 京都産業大学論集,
vol. 2 ; Jimbunkagaku Keiretsu 人文科学系列 vol. 1, pp. 182–204. Idem (2),
Mikkyōgaku (密教学) 9, pp. 42–55. A Synopsis of the Madhyamakālaṅkāra of
Śāntarakṣīta. JIBS No. XX-2, pp. 995–989.

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ta's works, as well as his Māl and SDNS, which were also written as independent philosophical expositions. However, since Haribhadra is a successor to the Yogācāra-mādhyamika tradition of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, he has inherited much from the previous masters of this school. This is clearly seen in those portions of the AAPV where Haribhadra defines his stance as a Yogācāra-mādhyamika through his logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools, (portions of the commentary that actually have no direct relation to the Prajñāpāramitā sūtra on which he is supposedly commenting), since these logical proofs and refutations correspond largely to those of the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's MAP, Māl, and his SDNS. Even beyond the selections translated below, for example, Haribhadra's refutation of the various sorts of causation is the same as that appearing in

(9) AAPV W pp. 62425–6425 V pp. 45732–46823


(10) AAPV W pp. 96926–97618 V pp. 54922–55325
Amano Kouei 天野宏英.
It is then the appearance in Haribhadra’s writings of passages found also in the works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that shows his indebtedness to the latter two masters. Thus, in the translation to follow, I have attempted to indicate those passages which are found also in the MAK, MAV, and MAP. Generally speaking, the proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) is accomplished through the refutation of the views of various school in the writings of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra, and in most cases the refutation begins with confuting the views of non-Buddhists and Buddhists that the external world is real.

In this first case, it is pointed out that atomic theory is the necessary basis for asserting that the external world is real. There are then three varieties of atomic theory, those of the Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, which are then refuted in that order. Basically, these Yogācāra-mādhyamikas propose that a real external world cannot be proven so long as atomic theory cannot be established. Such atomic theories depend on the concept of intrinsic nature (svabhāva), and by logically confuting atomic theory the proposition of things possessing an intrinsic nature is destroyed. Such a refutation of atomic theory seems to have originated in the Viṃśatikā (VŚ) of Vasubandhu, verse XI

(11) SDNS (2), pp 119-129.
(12) Mimaki Katsumi 御牧克己.
and its commentary.

The Yogacāra-mādhyamika then uses this manner of refuting the external world to deny the subjective reality (vījñānamātra) of the Yogacāra school represented by the Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins:

3. KAMALĀŚĪLA’S AND HARIBHADRĀ’S REFUTATION OF THE SATYĀKĀRA AND ALIKĀKĀRA-VĀDINS

I. The characteristics of these two schools

We may explain this subject from the following three points of view:

Their respective view of (1) image (ākāra), (2) self-cognition (svasa-nivedana) and (3) the three natures (trisvabhāva). To begin with, it is helpful to refer to the explanations given in the Jñānasūtrasamuccaya-nibandhana of Bodhibhadra (c. A.D. 10C~11C). According to this work, the Satyākāra-vādin maintains that the images (ākāra) of cogni-

(13) Vś pp. 625-72

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuṣaḥ / na ca te saṁhataḥ yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati // 11 //

(14) A commentary of Jñānasūtrasamuccaya which was written by Aryadeva (?) Katsumi Mimaki.


(15) Concerning this date see Katsura Syoryu 桂縚隆, Dharmakīrti ni okeru Jikoninshiki no Riron ダルママキールディにおける「自己認識」の理論(Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Svasa-nivedana). Nanto Bukkyō or Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 南都仏教, No. 23. p. 8 Nov. (1969)
tion possess a dependent nature \((\text{paratantra-svabhāva})\), while the Alīkākāra-vādin maintains the images of cognition are imaginary by nature \((\text{parikalpita-svabhāva})\). This explanation suggests to us one way in which we might understand the differences in the theories of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādins.

I. A. According to the theory of Satyākāra-vādin:

[1] Images \(\text{(ākāra)}\) such as the color blue, are real \(\text{(satya)}\). However, when these images are wrongly interpreted as being either subjective or objective, or when they are misunderstood as being either eternal or temporary, such discriminations are unreal. Nevertheless, images \(\text{(ākāra)}\) themselves are always real and existent.

[2] Independent self-cognition \(\text{(svasaṃvedana)}\) apart from images, such as the color blue, cannot exist. Self-cognition is none other than the very manifestation of images themselves. Therefore, self-cognition and images cannot be separated from each other, because they are identical.

[3] Images \(\text{(ākāra)}\) are inseparable from cognition \(\text{(vijñāna)}\), which has a dependent nature \(\text{(paratantra-svabhāva)}\) because it depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness \(\text{(samanantara-pratyaya)}\). Accordingly images \(\text{(ākāra)}\) also possess a dependent nature \(\text{(paratantra-svabhāva)}\). It is the misconceiving of these images, which

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(16) Yūichi Kajiyama.
(17) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3. p. 181, 197, 198.
(18) MAK. XLVII and MAV cf. Note (205).
Māl P200b5 D183b1 cf. Note 32.
have a dependent nature, as something that may be separated into an external world and internal world, or as things which are eternal or temporary, that imparts to these images an imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). When self-cognition (svasaṁvedana) accompanied by images, which has a dependent nature (paratāntara-svabhāva), is separated from an imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), it becomes absolute perfection (parinīśpanna-svabhāva). Therefore, independent self-cognition (svasaṁvedana) which has a dependent nature apart from images (ākāra) is impossible. Accordingly images (ākāra) themselves exist as a reality even in the self-cognition of sages. The distinction between the direct perception (pratyakṣa) of an ordinary person and the direct perception of sages actually lies in whether or not imaginary thought-constructions (vikalpa) are projected on real images (satyākāra).

I.B. **According to the theory of Alikākāra-vādin:**

(1) Both the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhā-kākāra) are unreal (alika), or imaginary. Those images are produced through dependence on error (bhṛnti), and therefore, they could not

(19) Katsura Syoryu. ibid Note 15, p. 13.
(20) AAPV W 631²⁵–632²⁸ V 462²⁰–²⁸
[objection :] A thing whose nature is erroneous (bhṛnti) makes an unreal image (alikākāra) manifest. Therefore, even though an image (ākāra) is nonexistent (asat), perception (saṁvedana) would appear due to this error (bhṛnti).
[Answer :] Your statement is incorrect. What does the word “error (bhṛnti)” mean? Does it imply: 1) a latent impression (vāsanā) which produces confusion (vibhrama) and which remains as a cognition (jñāna) of a cause (hetu-bhūta); or 2) nothing more than the erroneous cognition (bhṛntam eva jñānam) which remains as a result (kārya) of and produced from such a latent impression (vāsanā)? Let’s examine which one is correct. 1) If the first alternative is maintained, it is illogical (ayukta) that they (viz., images) are perceived through that [latent impression], since its cause (as a latent impression) does not have a necessary connection (apratisātabhātavat) with [those] images (ākāra). Also,
be real (satya).

[2] Only independent self-cognition (svasaṁvedana) which is detached from the images of both the perceived and the perceiver is real and this means the nondual cognition (advayajñāna). Accordingly both images and self-cognition are independent of each other. In fact, the difference between the perception of ordinary people and the supermundane cognition (nirvikalpalokottarajñāna) of sages lies in whether or not the images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in their cognition.

[3] Both images of the perceived and the perceiver which are based otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (atiprasanga). Nor is the necessary connection (pratibandha) with a causal relation (tad-utpatti) possible [between images and latent impression], because otherwise a dependent nature (paratantratva) would follow as before. 2) If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (pratibandha) between image (ākāra) [and cognition (vijñāna)] is not a causal relation (tad-utpatti), but a relation of identity (tādātmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously should be a causal relation (hetu-phalatva). For this reason, it is hard to avoid the problem that these [images] would come to have a dependent nature (paratantratva), since these [images] are not separate from it [viz., cognition], like error (bhṝāntivat). Otherwise what would they be? Mālī P202b3-6 D185a4-6

paricchedo 'ntar anyo' yaṁ bhāgo bahir iva sthitaiḥ / jñānasyābhedino bhedapratibhiṣo by upaplavaiḥ // (See Tosaki Hiromasa 戸崎宏正. Bukkyō Ninshikiron no Kenkyū (Jōkan) 仏教認識論の研究 上巻 p. 313.)

(21) Katsura Shōryū. ibid Note 15, p. 13.
on error (bhrānti) have an imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). When cognition (vijñāna), which depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness and thus has a dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), is separated from the two images of the perceived and the perceiver which have an imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), it becomes absolute perfection (parinispanna-svabhāva). To put it in another way, self-cognition (svasaṁvedana), which is only the operation of perception, is absolutely perfect (parinispanna-svabhāva). The cognition of ordinary people is always accompanied by the images of the perceived and the perceiver, which have an imaginary nature. On the other hand, the self-cognition of sages is the nondual cognition (advayajñāna), which is only the operation of perception and is detached from an unreal image, and is absolutely perfect, because it is separated from the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhakākāra), which are imaginary by nature.

II. The method of refutation

The purpose of Śāntarakṣita’s, Kamalāśīla’s, and Haribhadra’s refuting the various views of other schools, such as atomic theories of Vaiśeṣika, Vaibhāṣika, and Sautrāntika, or the epistemology of Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins, is to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva). To do this, they begin by refuting the views that admit some intrinsic nature (svabhāva), in other words, they prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva). This method of refutation itself as a proof that all things are devoid of

(22) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3, p. 181, 187, 199.
(23) Yūichi Kajiyama. ibid Note 8, pp. 114–143.
intrinsic nature, is actually indirect, in the sense that they negate the views of other schools. This negation proceeds by dividing the various views that admit some intrinsic nature (svabhāva) into classes of alternatives and refuting them in order. This leads to the Mādhyamika

(24) Māl P198a⁶-b⁵ D181a⁶-b⁴

yaṅ dag pa'i tshad ma ŋid kyis sgrub po // 'di ltar dños po rnams la don dam pa'i ŋo bo ŋid cig¹ yod par gyur na nram pa gñis kho nar 'gyur te / thams cad rgyu daṅ rkyen la rag las te / skye ba'i phyir mi rtag pa'i ŋo bo ŋid yin te / dper na mdo sde pa daṅ / rnal 'byor spyod pa pa nram 'dod pa lta bu žig gam / raṅ bzin gyis yaṅ dag par grub pa'i bdag ŋid kyi phyir brtan² pa'i khoṅs su gtogs pa žig yin te / dper na mu stegs can la sog sags po dog gis³ bdag la sog sags pa kun pa rtags pa rtags pa lta bu žig yin graṅ / rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spāṅs te gnas pa'i mtshanid yin pa'i phyir phuṅ po gsum pa ni med do // ŋo bo ŋid 'di rnam pa gñi ga yaṅ don dam pa par ni ruṅ ste / de sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma med pa' phyir daṅ / gnod par byed pa yaṅ srid pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar mños sum mam⁴ / rjes su dpag pa žig sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yin par 'gyur graṅ na / de la dños po'i ŋo bo ŋid daṅ po ni gñi gas kyaṅ yaṅ dag par 'grub pa med do // 'di ltar rgyu daṅ 'bras ba'i dños po grub na / de 'grub par 'gyur ba žig na / rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'i dños po de yaṅ re žig mños sum gyi sgo nas ni don dam pa par mi 'grub po // de ni dbaṅ po las byuṅ ba'i mños sum mam / raṅ rig pa'i mños sum gyis 'grub graṅ⁵ tshu rol mthouse ba rnams rnal 'byor pa'i mños sum gyis the sād mi 'dogs pa'i phyir daṅ / yid kyi mños sum gaṅ la yaṅ ma grags pa'i phyir de dag gis ni de 'grub par ni mi bsam mo // 1. D. gcig 2. D. brten 3. P has / bdag la sog sags pa dag gis / 4. P 'am 5. P has /

"[The Yogācāra–mādhyamika] prove [that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva)] by the method of the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). This is because, if all things have intrinsic nature (svabhāva) in absolute truth, there would be two kinds of intrinsic nature. That is to say, 1) because all things are produced by depending upon cause (hetu) and condition (pratyaya), they have a temporary (anitya) intrinsic nature such as that which Sautrāntika or Yogācāra school assert, or 2) because all things can be established as a real by nature, they are belonged to the class of immovables (dīrgha) such as the self (atman) which is imagined by non-Buddhist. It is impossible that a third alternative can be established because the eternal (nitya) and the temporary (anitya) are mutually exclusive (parastara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣana). The two kinds of intrinsic nature are not reasonabk with respect to view of this intrinsic nature from the standpoint of absolute truth (paramārthas). This is because there is no the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) to prore these two and because there is also way of rejecting them. The reason is that either

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truth that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Although this method of negation itself characterizes the tradition of the Mādhyamika beginning with Nāgārjuna (circa A.D. 150–250) and continued by his followers Ārya-Deva (c. A.D. 170–270), Buddhapālita (c. A.D. 470–540), Bhavāviveka (c. A.D. 500–570) and Candrakīrti (c. A.D. 600–650), it was Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra that embraced this method and integrated with it the formal logic of Dharmakīrti. Applying this new synthesis with systems of debate, they sought to establish the principle of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) and refuted the two theories within the Yogācāra school of Satyākāra and Alikākāra. They went on to refute even the view of Dharmakīrti as a Satyākāra-vādin, though the latter vacillates between the position of the Sautrāntika and Satyākāra-vādin depending on the context. Kamalaśīla, in his Māl, seeks to demonstrate that all things are

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(25) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid Note 5, p. 2, 7, 9.
(26) cf. 3. III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRĀDVAYA.
(27) D. Malvania. Durvekamāra's Dharmśtaraprādīpa (Being a subcommentary

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Tosaki Hiromasa 戸崎宏正.

devoid of intrinsic nature by the dual method of the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) and testimony (āgama). In particular, he gives much attention to proof by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa).

As he stated, "It is not only by testimony or a reduction to absurdity (prasaṅga) that we [Yogācāra-mādhyamika] intend to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva), but by the method of the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa)."

Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra demonstrate that assertions of the Satyākāra and Alikākara-vādins cannot be proven by the two valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), that is to say, direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa) respectively.

It is especially causation that they scrutinize by these two valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), because if causation can be established, some intrinsic nature (svabhāva) would be allowed as a reality, for instance, either an eternal or a temporary intrinsic nature would be established.

III. The essential focus of the refutation

III. A. The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyākāra-vādin
lies in pointing out contradictions that occur when they assert that images (ākāra) such as color blue are always real.

The focus of refutation in the Māl of Kamalaśīla is as follows:

(32–)
“If you [viz., Satyākāra-vādin] assert that images (ākāra) are real, then [the cognition (vijñāna) that should be expected to be unitary (ekatva)] would become manifold just like the nature of images themselves because images (ākāra) of cognition with respect to such things as pictures and so forth are manifold. If it is correct to understand that manifold cognition (vijñāna) arises in order to establish the principle of manifold images (ākāra), then it would be impossible to have a cognition (vijñāna) which grasps images (ākāra) that exist as if they cover an object. This is because it is impossible for cognition (vijñāna), as something non-material (amūrtatva), to occupy space. It is also not reasonable for something which does not occupy space to have any distinction such as north

(32) Māl P200b2–6 D183a8–b2

(32a) PV. II. 205a

vjātinām anārambhān nālākhāyādau vicitrādhīṣṭ
and east. And this is because, since cognition (vijñāna) does not have any direction, it is impossible that [images (ākāra)] can appear within cognition (vijñāna) as if they are spread over an object. Since images (ākāra) [that should be expected to be manifold (aneka)] do not differ from unitary cognition (vijñāna) by nature, they must then have a unitary nature, like the nature of cognition (vijñāna-svarūpavat). On the other hand, if [images (ākāra)] differ from [cognition (vijñāna)] by nature, they could not be grasped by cognition, like an object. In the latter case, [cognition and images] differ from each other. If, in order to grasp [an image], you [Satyākāra-vādin] require the imagining of images one after another, this would mean an infinite regress (anavasthā). For images (ākāra) can never be perceived in succession.”

This method of focusing on the incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and manifoldness (aneka) between cognition (vijñāna) and images (ākāra) is found in the writing of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra. It was also adopted by Ratnākaraśanti (c. 11c), who was a Alikākāra-vādin, when he refuted the view of Jñānaśrimitra (c. 980–1030), who was a Satyākāra-vādin. Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra have inherited this manner of debate from Śāntarakṣita who had adopted it when refuting the four kinds of causation. Going back further this refutation of the four kinds of causation can be traced to the Satyadvayavibhaṅga.

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(33) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi 櫻山雄一, Kōki Indo Bukkyō no Ronrigaku 後期インド仏教の論理学 (Indian Buddhist Logic in the Later Period.) p. 245. Koza Bukkyō Shisō No. 2 講座仏教思想 Ninshikiron Ronrigaku 識論理学 (1974).
(34) Katsura Shoryu. cf. Note 15 p. 32
(35) SDP D 28b6
(36) SDNS (2) pp. 119–128
How then is the incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and manifoldness (aneka) with respect to cognition (vijnāṇa) and images (ākāra) established?

In the Māl of Kamalaśīla, this incompatibility is used to refute the view of Satyākāra-vādın when he demonstrates that causation cannot be proven by means of direct perception (pratyakṣa) as sense perception (indriya-pratyakṣa). Incompatibility is shown to occur when cognition (vijnāṇa) that should be expected to be a unity (ekatva) logically becomes manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (ākāra-svarū-patva). The model for this argument has been directly taken from the refutation of atomic theory. He makes it clear that the errors (doṣa) which were found in the case of examining an atom (parāmaṇu) pertain also in this case, because cognition (vijnāṇa) that should be expected to be unity (ekatva) and immaterial (amūrtatva) would have extension (deśa-vitāna) or portions (sāvayavatā), like an atom, and would be devoid of a single nature (ekatva).

In conclusion, Kamalaśīla points out that the Satyākāra-vādın's view involves a contradiction of direct perception (pratyakṣa) itself in that.

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(37) Concerning this date see Katsumi Mimaki cf. Note 3, INTRODUCTION p. 4.
(38) SDK XIV D2a–b, SDV D7a, SDP D 28b
du mas gcig gi dānos mi byed // du mas du ma byed ma yin // gcig gis du ma’i dānos mi byed // gcig gis gcig byed pa yaṅ min // cf. SDNS (2) p. 119.
(39) Māl P198b–b D181b
de la re žig dbaṅ po’i mjon sum gyis ni de mi ‘grub ste / ....... Māl P200b–6 D183a–b cf. Note 32
(40) cf. Translation II-1-A-2-II-1-A-2-4
Concerning Śāntarakṣita see Yuichi Kagiyama. cf. Note 8 pp. 127–8
(41) cf. Note 32, Translation II-1-A-2-1-II-1-A-2-4
direct perception, in this case, includes imagingary thought-construction (vikalpa) because it grasps not only the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) that is the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa) but also the universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) that exists by definition within imaginary thought-construction (vikalpa). In the same manner, Haribhadra also refutes their view by pointing out that it is contrary to the definition of direct perception, which is devoid of imaginary thought-construction (vikalpa). This is because cognition itself involves imaginary thought-construction when multiple cognitions (anekajñāna) occurs at the same time (yugapad).

III. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRĀDVAYA

Citrādvaya means that cognition (vijñāna) which possesses manifold

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(42) Māl P202b6–7 D185a6–7

gal te mnon sum ni rtog pa'i ŋo bo ŋid tsam žig yin no že na / 'o na ni mnon sum raṅ gi mtshan ŋid kyi yul can ma yin te / rtogs¹ pa'i ŋo bo ŋid ni spyi'i mtshan ŋid kyi yul can yaṅ yin pa'i phyir ro // 1. D rtog

Massaki Hattori. ibid. Note 1, pp. 79–80.

(43) NB, I. 4.


Massaki Hattori. ibid. Note. 1. p. 25.

Perception (pratyakṣa) is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā): pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham. And pp. 82–83


On the other hand, Dharmakīrti proves ‘pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham’ on the ground that a unitary cognition perceives manifoldness. (See Hiromasa Tosaki, ibid. Note 20, p. 307.)

PV. II. 207

nānārtikā bhavet tasmāt siddhato'pi avikalpikā / vikalpayann apy ekārthaṁ yato' nyad api paśyati //

(44) cf. Translation [II-1-A-2-5], PV. II. 197ab. athākāyatanatve’ pi nānekaṁ grhyate sakṛt /
(citra) images is unitary. The Satyākāra-vādin school asserts that cognition is always accompanied by a number of images (ākāra) which are real (satya); however, any imaginary thought-constructions (vikalpa) with respect to these real images (ākāra) such as concepts like the external world or the internal world, or “permanent” or “temporary”, are in themselves always unreal additions to the images. They then had to answer the question of how a unitary cognition can possess many images. That is why they advocate the theory of citrādvaya. This position was taken by Prajñākaragupta (c. A.D. 700–750) in his commentary, the Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam, on verses 200 and 221 of chapter II (Pratyakṣa) of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikā.

“Although cognition has manifold images, it is none other than unitary. This is because cognition, having manifold images, differs by nature from the manifoldness of the external world itself. The manifoldness of the external world is distinguishable, but manifold images of cognition such as the color blue are indistinguishable. The reason is that the images such as the color blue that are the contents of perception itself cannot be perceived independently. Accordingly, although cognition is manifold, it is unitary because images such as the color blue cannot be separately discriminated.”

How did Haribhadra then refute this theory? As mentioned above,
Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra reached their refutation of the Satyākāra-vādin view by pointing out that the Satyākāra-vādin assertion involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyakṣa). In the case of citrādvaya as well, Haribhadra refutes this stance by utilizing the same method. Namely, their ground of asserting that a unitary cognition possesses manifold images (ākāra) is based upon the notion that manifold images such as the colors blue, yellow, and so forth which manifest at one moment, cannot be distinguished from one another by direct perception (pratyakṣa). However, Haribhadra refutes this as follows: the presumption that manifold images cannot be distinguished by direct perception also cannot be ascertained by direct perception.

III. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikākāra-vādin.

The Alikākāra-vādin defines image (ākāra) as the images of the perceived and the peceiver (grāhya-grāhakākāra). According to their theory, an image (ākāra) is none other than imaginary and unreal (alīka), while only self-cognition (svasaṁvedana), which is detached from both the images of the perceived and the perceiver, is real. Accordingly, self-cognition means a nondual cognition (advaya-jñāna) and has only the operation of perception. Therefore, unreal images have nothing to do with real self-cognition, because unreal things cannot have any relation to some other thing. This is because, if self-cognition has some relation to unreal images, it would become unreal, like the image (ākāra). Then, how can the nondual cognition (advaya-jñāna) asserted by them, which is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver,

(51) cf. Note 42, 43. Translation II-1-B-3 (Conclusion 1). Direct perception (pratyakṣa) does not grasp both distinction and nondistinction.
be proven?

(a) Kamalaśīla shows that nondual cognition (advaya-jñāna) cannot be proven by inference (anumāṇa). Namely, he states that none of the logical reasons (hetu), a relation of identity (svabhāva), effect (kārya), or non-perception (anupalabdhi), can be used to establish a proof.

If images that manifest as two [viz., grāhya-grāhaka] are also unreal, [as Alīkākāra-vadin asserts], how can cognition exist as something with a nature apart from these in absolute truth? A real cognition that is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot be perceived by ordinary people. Otherwise everyone could obtain the truth.

It [viz., self-cognition that is devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver] cannot be proven by inference (anumāṇa). This is because any logical reason to prove it cannot be established.
To begin with, inference based on a relation of identity (svabhāva) is impossible. This is because the identity of it [self-cognition as a nondual cognition] with some other thing is the very thing to be proven.

Inference based on an effect (kārya) is impossible. This is because it is untenable that a non-dual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) has a causal relation with something else. It (viz., self-cognition as a nondual-cognition) cannot be perceived by a sense organ (indriya). A different result apart from it (viz., self-cognition) does not exist.

The reason is that, according to your theory, the nondual thing (viz., self-cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) itself would become the result, but that is the very thing to be proven. Neither can it be shown by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). Because the two manifestations [of the images of the perceived and the perceiver] are equivalent to the horns of a rabbit [viz., non-existence] [according to your theory], it is not a result. Otherwise, [if both images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in self-cognition], causality, which can be proven by direct perception (pratyakṣa) and non-perception (anupalabdhi), could be established. However, nothing can be perceived by non-dual cognition (advaya-jñāna) from the point of view of absolute truth (paramārthatas). Non-perception (anupalabdhi) is not an inference to prove the reality [of non-dual cognition], because it is a proof of nonexistence.

(b) Moreover, Kamalaśīla refutes the view of the Alīkākāra-vādin that non-dual cognition (advaya-jñāna) is real by means of pointing
out that there is neither the relation of identity (tādātmya) nor causation (tadutpatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (ālikākāra). Even though images (ākāra) are unreal (ālika), the identity of cognition and images should be acknowledged as long as these unreal images manifest in cognition. If so, both cognition and images would become unreal. Thus Kamalaśīla points out that the view of Alīkākāra-vādin involves contradiction.

(53)…

If the nature of cognition (jñāna) is real (satya), there is neither the relation of identity (tādātmya) nor causation (tadutpatti) between a thing which truly manifests and images (ākāra) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) and the unreal (ālika), which are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa), to have the relation of identity (tādātmya) and this does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity.

(53) Māl P182b3-8 D167b3-7
(tādātmya) at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with respect to time and their own nature.

[Accordingly there is no causation (tadutpatti) between a true nondual cognition (advaya-jñāna) and an unreal image (ākāra).]

It is unreasonable that the manifestation [of images] is certified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reductio-nistic (atiprasāṅga). Accordingly you should surely acknowledge a relation of identity (tādātmya) between them, since the manifestation of unreal images [in the present case], which do not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowledged. Thus both of them become unreal (alīka). Otherwise [if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and images], how can an unreal image (ākāra) and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to [only nondual cognition] as real.

IV. Conclusion

The method and contents of refuting the views of the Satyākāra and Alīkākāra-vādin are common to the MAK and MAV of Śāntarakṣita, the MAP and Māl of Kamalaśīla, and the AAPV of Haribhadra.

In the case of refuting the view of the Satyākāra-vādin, the incompatibility of unity (eka) and manifoldness (aneka) between cognition (vijñāna) and images (akāra) is pointed out. In conclusion, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra show the error that this view involves, which is a contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyakṣa) in that direct perception that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought-construction (vikalpa) becomes related to imaginary thought-construction.

On the other hand, in case of refuting the view of Alīkākāra-vādin,
they show that the nondual cognition (advaya-jñāna) which is
devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhakā-kāra) cannot be proven by inference (anumāna) such as a relation of identity (svabhāva), effect (kārya) or non-perception (anupalabdhi). Moreover it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity (tādātmya) nor a causal relation (tadutpatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (alikākāra).

In light of these refutations, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to either the Satyākāra-vādin or the Alikākāra-vādin. This is also true for Śāntarakṣita. Nevertheless we should examine the sound basis on which they have been called the major philosophers of the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school and how they are distinguished from other philosophers of the Mādhyamika school, such as Bhāvaviveka who is a Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Candrakīrti who is a Prāsaṅgika. At the same time, we should ask what the philosophy of Yogācāra means in the context of Kamalaśīla’s philosophy. At the outset we should note that Kamalaśīla describes the philosophy of Yogācāra in the sense of a school accepting only subjective reality (vijñāna-mātra) or mind-only (citta-mātra), as suitable for the attainment of the final truth of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva). Namely, he conceives of the philosophy of Yogācāra as a good approach to the absolute truth of the Mādhyamika. However this philosophy seems to be insignificant for Kamalaśīla, apart from its context as a theoretical means to arrive at the highest Mādhyamika truth.

(54) cf. Note 56.
(55) Māl P194a8–b1 D177b6

mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi ňo bo’am ŝes pa’i ňo bo yan dag par
This may be seen in the Māl of Kamalaśīla. The Yogācāra depending on scriptures such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and the *Gahanavyūha* asserts that all things consist in subjective reality (*vijñāna-mātra*) or mind-only (*citta-mātra*), that only mind is an absolute existant, and that except for mind nothing exists. Therefore, they object to the position that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (*nīkṣvabhāva*) can be proven. Kamalaśīla has replied to this objection of Yogācāra.

(56)...

These [scriptures] are not suitable for testimony. The existence of

\[ni ma grub ste\] / Whether a lamp has the nature of an object (*artha*) as the external world or of cognition (*vijñāna*) cannot be decided from the standpoint of absolute truth.

*BhK* II. P53b\(4\) D49a\(1\)

\[don dam par na sens kyaṅ bden par mi ruṅ ste\] / It is impossible from the point of view of the highest truth that mind [as well as objects of the external world] is real.

*BhK* II. pp. 6-7.

*Cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anutpānna* / Mind is also non-arising just like illusion from the viewpoint of the highest truth.

(56) Māl P170b\(4\) - 171a\(7\), D156b\(7\) - 157b\(1\)

de yaṅ khaṅs su mi ruṅ ba ṅid de / ji ltar sens yod pa ṅid du bstān pa de bzin du gzung kyaṅ mdo de daṅ de las rnam pa du mar yod pa ṅid du bstān pa kho na ste / de'i phyir de yaṅ ci ste don dam par yod pa ṅid du mi bzuṅ / 'on te don tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir daṅ / mdo gzan dag las kyaṅ bkag pa'i phyir don dam par yod par rnam par mi gzung\(1\) ste / gaṅ zag la bdag med pa tsam la gzung pa la ldem por dgoṅs pas gtul bar bya ba de lta bu'i 'bsam pa la lṭos te / de bstān pa 'ba'a ṅig tu zad do ęs bya bar brjod na gal te de lta na ni sens kyaṅ 'og nas 'byuṅ ba'i tshed mas gnod pa'i phyir daṅ / de mdo gzan las kyaṅ / ńo bo ṅid med pa / ni bstān pa'i phyir dam pa ṅid du ma 'dzin par sens tsam po ṅid de ni rim gyis don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgya mtsho la gzung ba'i phyir bstān pa 'ba'a ṅig tu zad do sān du zuṅ 'ṣig\(3\) / ¼ 'di ltar gaṅ ṅig cig car chos ma lus pa ńo bo ṅid med pa ṅid du rτogs par mi nus pa de re ṅig sens tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi'i don ńo bo ṅid med pa ṅid la 'jug go // de ṅid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par lta na rnam kyi // gzung daṅ 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur // ęs gzung so // de'i 'og tu rim gyis sens kyi ńo bo ṅid la so sor rτog na / de yaṅ bdag med pa ṅid du khoṅ du chud nas zab mo'i tshul la 'jug par 'gyur te / de skad du / bcom ldan 'das kyis /
color-form (rūpa) as well as mind is explained in various manners in several different scriptures. Accordingly why don’t you understand that it [viz., color-form (rūpa)] also exists from the standpoint of absolute truth?

[Objection:] The object of the external world cannot be established from the standpoint of absolute truth (paramārthatas), since it involves a contradiction with respect to the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) and since it is denied in other scriptures also. The object of the external world is just stated according to the aim of disciples (vinaya) who want to arrive at only the non-existence of the essential nature in a person (pudgala-nairātmya), because of the secret purpose of the scriptures of leading them there.

[Answer:] If so, since mind (citta) is also refuted through the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), which will be stated later on, and since it is explained as devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhāva) even in other scriptures, you should understand that this theory of mind-only (citta-mātra) was taught only to help one comprehend the ocean of the theory of absolute truth without regarding it as an
absolute existent. The reason is that those who cannot recognize all things as devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) in one moment, recognize gradually that an object as the external world is devoid of intrinsic nature by firstly depending upon the theory of mind-only (citta-mātra). Therefore, [the Blessed One] taught that the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhaka) are destroyed by those who examined [the external world] by means of reason (yukti). After that, when they gradually scrutinize the nature of mind, recognizing its being devoid of intrinsic nature too, they would comprehend the profound theory. The Blessed One taught as follows:

(56-1) Depending upon mind-only (citta-mātra), the Yogin does not imagine an object in the external world. Observing truth, he should transcend mind-only. After transcending mind-only, he should transcend non-manifestation [of the perceived and the perceiver]. The Yogin who thus abide in non-manifestation beholds the great vehicle (mahāyāna).

The spontaneous stage (anābhoga) which he reaches is tranquil and is purified by his devout vow. He observes that even perfect wisdom is devoid of intrinsic nature by means of the non-manifestation [of non-dual cognition].

Some other scholars advocate as follows:

(56-1) LAS, X-154ab
yuktyā vipaśyamānānāṁ grāhagrāhayaṁ na nirdhyate /


— 31 —
The theory of mind-only (citta-mātra) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional truth (samvṛtyā) since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the object of the external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot be established.

Therefore, although the Blessed One (Bhagavat) teaches that existences are product of the mind-only in order to indicate the above meaning, still he does not teach that it [viz., the existence of mind-only] is reasonable from the standpoint of absolute truth (paramārthatas). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the mind [as well as colorform (rūpa)] is devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva).
4. Summary of the contents of Haribhadra's Abhisamayā-śāstra Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā

The logical formula (prayoga)........W624 V457

A thing capable of effect implies: [I] a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya-rūpa) which belongs to the external world; or [II] a thing which has the nature of cognition (jñāna-rūpa). ......W624 V458

I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya-rūpa) which belongs to the external world. ......W624 V458

Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such as [I] Vaibhāṣika, [II] Sautrāntika.

I-1. The Vaiśeṣika hold that things which have a knowable nature (jñeya-rūpa) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected to one another (paras-para-samyukta-svabhāva) and form a unitary nature. ........W624 V458

This view is refuted by the following arguments:

I-1-1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms at one spot (eka-deśa). ........W624 V458

I-1-2. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms to form a whole (sarvātmanā). ........W624 V458

I-2. The Vaiśeṣika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering (asamāśliṣṭa), and that there are intervals remaining between them (sāntara). ......W624 V458

This view is refuted by the following arguments:
I-2-1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a single atom. 

This same refutuation is also applied to the case of the Satyākara-śāṅkara’s view. (cf. II-1-A-2-1)

I-2-2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single atom. (cf. II-1-A-2-2).

I-3. The Sautrāntika hold that atoms are an aggregation without intervals remaining between them (nir-antara). This view is refuted by the following arguments:

I-3-1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would be decided only by the side which is combined (samyoga-pakṣa) because ‘having no interval (nairantarya)’ is equivalent to ‘combination (samyoga).’

I-3-2. It is illogical that an uncombined (asamyukta) atom is surrounded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations (samāpatara-deśāvasthita) that are suitable to be called the side (dik-śabda-vācyā).

I-4. [Conclusion:] Distinction (bheda), which means the external world and which is produced by thought-construction, (kalpanoparacito) is not an essential component of efficiency (arthakriyāṅga).

II. Haribhadra refutes the view of the Yogācāra school (viz., Satyākāra and Alikākāra-vādins): They assert that a thing capable of effect (arthakriyā-yogya) means a thing which has the nature of cognition (jñāna-rūpa).
II-1. Haribhadra's refutuation of the view of Satyākāravādin (ones who assert that images are real): They explain the production of cognition (vijñāna) according to the casual relation with images (ākāra) of both the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhaka).

II-1-A. According to this theory, cognition (vijñāna) would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (ākāra-svarūpavat). On the other hand, images (ākāra) would become a unity (ekatva), like the nature of cognition (vijñāna-svarūpavat).

II-1-A-1. It is contradictory that cognition, which has a unitary nature, perceives manifold images (vaictryākāra).

II-1-A-2. It is contradictory that diverse cognitions (vijñāna) of the same kind (samānajātiya) occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijātiya-jñānavat).

II-1-A-2-1. It is contradictory that the cognition (vijñāna), which is thought to be situated in the center (madhya), like an atom, faces by nature the other cognitions in the very same manner that it faces a single (eka) cognition. This is because the other cognitions would mutually occupy the same point. (cf. I-2-1)

II-1-A-2-2. It is contradictory that the cognition, which is thought to be situated in the center, like an atom, faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner. This is because it would have parts and it would thus be devoid of unity (ekatva). (cf. I-2-2)

II-1-A-2-3. Cognitions would be regarded as if they manifest having extension (deśa-vitāna) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do not have space (adeśa) according to
your theory that cognition has a manifold nature. ........W627\textsuperscript{13} V459\textsuperscript{31}

II-1-A-2-4. The refutation of the view of the atomic theory can be applied to cognition (vijñāna). ........W627\textsuperscript{22} V460\textsuperscript{5}

II-1-A-2-5. [Conclusion:] Your statement that multiple cognitions (anekaiñāna) occur at the same time (yugapad) involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyakṣa-virodha). .......W627\textsuperscript{28} V460\textsuperscript{10}

II-1-B. The refutation of CITRĀDVAYA (the view that a cognition possessing manifold images is itself a unity). ........W628\textsuperscript{7} V460\textsuperscript{14}

II-1-B-1. It is contradictory that a single cognition (vijñāna) includes a manifold nature (citra-rūpa). ........W628\textsuperscript{7} V460\textsuperscript{14}

II-1-B-2. Manifoldness (citra) is incompatible with unity (ekatva). .........W628\textsuperscript{12} V460\textsuperscript{17}

II-1-B-3. [Conclusion 1 : ] It is contradictory that manifoldness appears as a unity in direct perception (pratyakṣa) since direct perception does not perceive a distinction. .......W628\textsuperscript{22} V460\textsuperscript{24}

II-1-B-4. [Conclusion 2 : ] It is contradictory that manifoldness (citra) also is single (eka) since concentration (yoga) and tranquility (kṣema) are not distinguished (abhinna). This is because the fact that concentration and tranquility are not distinguished from each other is not grasped by direct perception (pratyakṣa),........W629\textsuperscript{9} V460\textsuperscript{28}

II-2. Refutation of the view of the Alikākāra-vādin (ones who assert that images (ākāra) are unreal). ........629\textsuperscript{10} V461\textsuperscript{2}

(To be continued)
5. A Translation of Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka

Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā

[Major:] Whatever does not possess a single nature or a plural nature (ekâneka-svabhāva), does not have an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) from the standpoint of the highest truth (paramārthatas): such as an illusion (māyā).

[Minor:] Things set forth by some Buddhists and others (sva-para) are devoid of a single nature or a plural nature (ekâneka-svabhāva).

[Conclusion: Therefore, things set forth by some Buddhists and others are not capable of having an intrinsic nature.]

[This inference] is based on the principle of the perception of the incompatibility with the pervasive element (vyāpakaviruddhupalabdhi).

This means that the Tathāgata is like an illusion (māyopama). The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddha), since the action (pravyātti) of a sage (preksāvat) is pervaded by having purpose (prayojana-vat). A thing (padārtha) capable of effect (artha-

(101) cf. MAK 1. P48b8 D53a1-2 MAV P52b5-6 D56b7

bdag daṅ gzan smra’i’ dnos ’di dag / yaṅ dag tu na gcig pa daṅ // du ma’i raṅ bzin bral ba’i phyir // raṅ bzin med de gzugs brñan bzin // 1. MAV. PD

smras

BCP, p. 173

nīḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tatvataḥ svapaparīditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvāna viyogat pratibimbavat //

MAP P89a4-6 D87b2-3

gañ dag¹ gcig daṅ du ma’i raṅ bzin ma yin pa de dag ni don dam par² raṅ bzin med de / dper na gzugs brñan bzin no // bdag daṅ gzan gyis smras pa’i dnos po rnam kyang gcig daṅ du ma’i raṅ bzin ma yin pas þes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin te / gcig pa ŋid daṅ du ma ŋid dag gis raṅ bzin la khyab pa’i phyir ro // 1. D zag 2. P om.
kriyā-yogya) should be examined (vicārya) as an object (viṣaya). Otherwise, what sort of purpose (prayojana) can those who pursue effectiveness (arthakriyārthin) attain by means of investigating useless things (asad- artha-pādārtha-vicāra)?

Therefore, the thing which has an effect (arthakriyā-kārin) should be pursued.

Does it (viz., a thing capable of effect) imply: [I] a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya-rūpa) [which belongs to the external world]; or [II] the nature of knowledge (jñāna-rūpa), because they (viz., a thing cognizable and cognition) are also mutually incompatible (anyonya-vyavaccheda-rūpatva)?

[I] If the first alternative is maintained, does it (viz., a nature which is knowable (jñeya-rūpa)) imply: [I-1] intrinsic natures which are connected with one another (paras-para-saṃyukta-svabhava); or [I-2] a thing which is surrounded by atoms (paramāṇu) that are homogeneous compositions (saṃāna-jaṭiya), that are separated from one another by means of potency (saṃarthya), that have the nature of nonadhering (asaṃśliṣṭa-svarūpa), and that have intervals remaining between them.
(sàntara); or [I–3] a thing which is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (nir–antara)?

Then, [I–1] in the first case, [I–1–1] if X (viz., an atom) is combined with Y (viz., the other atoms) at one spot (ekà–deśa), then X would have parts (sàvayavatvo). Therefore, the single nature (ekatva) [of an atom] is destroyed, since it [the atom] is combined with other atoms (ānu) having natures different from one another (aparâpara–svabhāva).

[I–1–2] If you assert that an atom combines with other atoms to form a whole (sarvâtmanā), when the atom in the front (pūrva) is combined with another in the back (aparâṇu) to form a whole (sarvātmanā), the atom in the back also is combined with yet another in front of it. Therefore, no sort of atom can ever be established as a single entity (ekà–svabhāvatā) since their intrinsic natures (svabhāva) are mingled with each other on the ground that their combination (saṃyoga) depends on the two.

(106) Read yad vā according to [W] insted of yada [V].
(107) MAV P55a⁴ D59a³
   ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams mi reg kyaṅ bar med pas reg par ’du śes so //¹ 1. D om.
   MAP P95a⁵ D92b⁴
   gzan dag na re reg pa yaṅ ma yin la bar daṅ bcas pa dag kyaṅ ma yin mod kyi / ’dab¹ chags pa kho nar gnas so ṭes zer te / 1. P mdab
(104) (105) (107) MAK. XI ab MAV P55a⁸ D59a⁸
   ’byar ba daṅ ni bskor ba’m // bar med rnam par gnas kyan ruṅ //
   TS 1989 ab
   saṃyuktaṁ dūrādeśaśthaṁ nairantaravyavasthitam /
(108) MAV P55a⁵–⁶ D59a⁴–⁵
   phyogs gcig gis ’byar na ni cha śas yod par ’gyur te / raṅ bzin gzan daṅ gzan dag gis rdul gzan daṅ ’byar ba’i phyir ro /
(109) MAV P55a⁵ D59a⁴
   bdag ŋid thams cad kyiṣ ’byor na ni rdzas rnams ’dres par ’gyur te / rdul gyi raṅ bzin gcig pu gaṅ gis ’byar ba de ŋid gzan daṅ yaṅ ’byar ba’i phyir ro /
(109a) W aparâṇânumā
This is because the atom in the front abandons its own nature (sva-svabhāva) and produces, in all respects, the nature of another at the back on the grounds that it is combined with another at the back to form a whole. And though it [viz., atom in the front] is combined with [another at the back], it is non-existent (asattva).

In the same way, an atom at the back is also combined with another in the front.

For this reason, the foundation of combination (saṁyogāśraya) [viz., atom at the back] is non-existent (asattva) because an atom at the back abandons its own nature (sva-svabhāva) and it produces, in all respects, the nature of the atom in the front. Therefore, since it is unreasonable for unity (eka) to be affirmed (vidhi) and to be denied (pratīṣedha), which have the characteristics of excluding each other (paras-para-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇa) at the same time (ekadā), how can [an atom] be of a single nature (eka-svabhāvatā)?

[I-2] In the second case where [the knowable (viz., an atom)] is surrounded [by atoms with intervals remaining between them], even though contact (saṁsparśa) with the same sorts (samāna-jātiya) [of...

(110) MAP P95a8-95b2 D92b7-93a1
phyogs gnis pa ltar na yan rigs mthun¹ pa rnams dañ reg par mi 'dod du chug kyan / phrag ni snañ la dañ mun pa'i ŋo bo yin pa'i phyir rigs mi mthun pa snañ ba dañ³ mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams dañ ni reg par 'dod pa ŋid do / snañ bas mnon pa'i mun pa dañ bral ba ŋid dam⁴ / mun pas gnas su ma byas pa'i snañ ba dañ bral ba ŋid ni rigs pa dañ ldan pa ma yin te / de gnis⁶ 'byuh ba ni yul la sogs pa phan tshun bral ba tsam la rag las pa'i phyir ro / 1. P 'thun pa 2. P ŋo'i 3. D has / 4. P dañ 5. P de ŋid MAV P55a⁵-⁷ D59a⁵
bar yod pa yan bar dag tu snañ ba dañ mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams kyi go skabs yod par 'gyur te / phrag ni mun pa dañ snañ ba'i bdag ŋid yin pa'i phyir de dag dañ 'byar bar 'gyur ro /

— 40 —
atoms) is not acknowledged, [contact] with the different sort (vijātiya)  
of atoms (paramāṇu) of light (āloka) and darkness (tamas) is necessa-
riely acknowledged since the dividing space (chidra) has both the  
natures of light and darkness (āloka-tamo-rūpatvāt). This is because it  
is not reasonable that a location which is not reached (asamākrānta)  
by light (āloka) is devoid of darkness (tamas) or that a location which  
is not covered (an-āspādi-krīta) with darkness is devoid of light.  

This is why the two [viz., light and darkness] produce an inevitable  
connection (pratibaddha) only at the location, and so forth separated  
from each other. In the same way, the same error (doṣa) as stated  
immediately above would follow that.  

If the connection (samsparśa) with different sorts (vijātiya) [of atoms]  
is not acknowledged, then the atom in the center (madhyavartin) either  
[I-2-1] faces, by a single nature, one atom and all other atoms in the  
very same way, or [I-2-2] faces all the other atoms in different ways.  
Thus there are two alternative (vikalpa) ways of dealing with the  
problem.

(111) MAP P95b4-5 D93a³  
de la dbus na yod pa'i rdul phra rab gañ yin pa de rañ bžin gañ gis rdul phra  
rab gcig la bltas te gnas pa de ņid kyis g'zan la bltas sam / 'on te ma yin žes  
bya ba brtag pa gñis so /  
MAK. XI cd MAV P55a§ D59a6-7  
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la // bltas pa'i rañ bžin gañ yin pa /  
TS 1989 cd  
ekāṇuabhimukhaṁ rūpaṁ yad añor madhavarttinaḥ /  
MAK. XII MAV P55b¹ D59a⁷  
rdl phran g'zan la lta ba yañ // de ņid gal te yin brjod na // de lta yin na  
de lta bu // sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram //  
TS 1990  
aṇvantarābhimukhyena ted eva yadi kalpyate / pracayo bhūdharādīnām evam  
sati na yujyate //

— 41 —
In the case of the first:

[Major:] Whatever has an intrinsic nature which faces the other atom of a single nature (eka-rūpa) would occupy a same spot (eka-deśa) [that the surrounding atoms occupy]: e. g. the very atom [in the center] would occupy the same spot that the atom in the front occupies.

[Minor:] All the surrounding (parivāraka) [atoms] have a nature which faces a single atom (eka-paramāṇu).

[Conclusion: Therefore, all the surrounding atoms occupy the same spot.]

[This is an inference] formulated on the logical characteristic of essential identity (svabhāva-hetu). The logical reason (hetu) of this inference has not the fallacy of inadmissibleness (asiddhatā), since it [the atom in the center] is acknowledged to face [another atom] by having the very same nature. Neither is this contradictory (viruddhatā), since the logical reason (hetu) is present in homogeneous examples (sapakṣa).

On the other hand, if [the surrounding atoms] occupy points different
from (bhūna-deśa) one another, it would be impossible for them to face the single atom which is sought. This is because that atom does not have a diverse nature (aparāpara-svabhāva). Neither is the logical reason (hetu) inconclusive (anaikāntikatā), since it is not reasonable to face one another, if devoid of identity (svabhāva). Therefore, the surrounding (parivāraka) atoms would be located at the same point (eka-deśatā) because [the atom in the center] is lacking the condition to be surrounded (parivāryāvasthāna). When an assemblage (pracāya) [of atoms] does not exist from the standpoint of the highest truth (tattvatas), it is not reasonable for the atom (parāmaṇu) to be acknowledged as having a single nature (eka-svabhāva) simply because of their being devoid of the effect (arthakriyā) that is to be proved (sādhya).

Then in the second case, since the atom [in the center] separately faces and combines with the other atoms having a different nature from one another, it would have portions (sāvayavatā). Therefore, it is just evident that atoms are devoid of a single nature (ekatva). This is because the discrimination of an entity (vastu-bheda) is defined by its having an intrinsic nature (svabhāva-bheda).

On the other hand, [I-3-1] if you maintain the third alternative

(114) MAK XIII MAV P55b4–5 D59a3
rdul phran gzan la lta ba’i ŋos // gal te gzan du ’dod na ni // rab tu phra1
rdul ji lta bur // gcig pu cha šas med par ’gyur // 1. MAK. P. phra ba’i
TS 1991
avantarābhimukhyena rūpaṁ ced anyad iṣyate / kathāṁ nāma bhaved ekaḥ
paramāṇus tathā sati //
MAP P96a2–3 D93a7–93b1
phyogs gnis pa ltar na yaṅ yan lag daṅ bcas pa ŋid du thal bar ’gyur bar gsal
bar1 bdag gis rnam par ma phye’o // 1. D has rab tu
(115) MAV P55a7 D59a5–6
bar med pa’i phyogs kyaṅ ’byar ba’i phyogs daṅ tha dad pa med pa ŋid de /
where [an atom in the center] is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (*nairantaryā), [the nature of the atom in the center] is decided by the side which is combined (*saṃyoga–pakṣa).

‘Having no interval (*nairantaryā)’ is a synonym of ‘combination (*saṃyoga)’.

This is because there is no other alternative (*gati) for a thing which is devoid of intermediate space (*antarāla–deśa) except mutual combination (*parasparasāṁśleṣa). Even though the same sense is expressed by other words (*śabda), it does not mean to exist in a different manner (*anyathā). This is because otherwise unsuitable consequences would follow (*atiprasyaṅgāt).

[I-3-2]

[Objection:] On the other hand, only that uncombined (*asāmyukta) atom is surrounded by the many atoms which occupy an adjacent location (*samipatara–deśāvasthita) which should be called the side (*dik–śabda–vācyā).

[Answer:] It is not reasonable. This is because this word [“side”] is not established in practice (*artha-vattā) when this side and that side (*arvāk–para–bhūga) do not exist [in atom].

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(116) W *parasparasāṁśleṣamuktvā, V *parasparasāṁśleṣaṁ muktvā
(117) This atomic theory is also a theory of the Sautrāntika. cf. Yuichi Kajima. ibid. Note 5. p. 40.
(118) V *samipetara
[I-4]

[Objection:] Whatever is determined to have a different nature by
another thing is false (asat) from the point of reality: e. g. distinctions
such as “this side” and “that side” (pārāpārādi-bhedā-vat). According
to this reasoning, [an atom] is not truly endowed with portions (sāva-
yavatva).

[Answer:] [Your statement] is incorrect. This is because it is
impossible for those who admit the external world (bahir-arthatvādin) to
confuse this with that due to distinctions of mutual relation (vyapekṣā-
-bhedā): e. g. father and his son.

Only the true (tattvika) should be acknowledged as a nature (ṛūpa).
This is because when it is the further shore (pāra) that depends on
something, it is never the nearer shore (apāra) that depends on it [the
further shore].

Otherwise, how can the two which are called the nearer and further
shores (pārāparābhidhāna-taṭa) exist without the confusion (asānkarya)
when both the nearer and further shores are not established from the
point of view of absolute truth (apāramārthikatva)?

(119) I cannot identify this source.

cf. MK. XIV–5

anyad anyat pratītiyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte’ nyataḥ / yatpratītya ca yat tasmāt
tad anyan nopapadyate //
MK. XVIII–10

pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat / na cānyad api tat tasmān
nocchinānaḥ nāpi śāśvatām //

(119a) Read pārāpāra according to [V]. [W] has pārvāra.
(120) Read pārāpāra according to [V]. [W] has pārvāra.
(121) Read apāram according to [V]. [W] has apāram.
(122) Read pārāpāra according to [V]. [W] has pārvāra.
(123) Read pārāpāra according to [V]. [W] has pārvāra.
This is because it is said that the other thing from what is thought to be the further shore (pārabhimata) is none other than the nearer shore (apāratva) which [you] want to call (vivakṣita) the nearer shore. If it (viz., the further shore) is also thought to be a thing which is imagined, the two (viz., the nearer and the further shore) would be identical (aikya). And in the same way things which are dependent upon something [viz., the nearer shore] (tad-āśrita) would not exist without confusion (asamkīrṇa). This is because distinction (bheda) which is produced by thought—construction (kalpanoparacito) is not an essential component of efficiency (arthakriyāṅga).

That thing which is established by itself (svataḥ siddha-rūpa) is none other than nondual cognition (advayāṁ jñānam) which has a single nature (eka-svabhāva) and which is separate from the relationship pertaining between cognitum and cognizer (grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-rahita) from the standpoint of highest truth (paramārthatas), because:

1) an object (viṣaya) exists by means of perception (saṁvedana), 2)
an object (artha) is entirely invisible (atyanta-parokṣatva) when it is not being perceived, 3) a particular adapted effect is produced (pratiniyatasya kāryasyodaya) by means of the immediately preceding moment of mind (samanantara-pratyaya), 4) it is impossible to conceive of [the production of a particular adapted effect] when its (the immediately preceding moment of mind) is excluded.

This is because if [nondual knowledge] were devoid of cause (ahetukatva), it would always exist, etc.

Because it is impossible that an eternal thing (nityatva) has efficiency (arthakriya), etc., a thing which perishes as soon as it has been produced (udayānantarāpavargin) has a connection with its own cause (sva-hetu).

Images (ākāra) merely manifest there (viz., in that cognition) by means of the maturation of latent impressions which adhere to a thing which has been existing as an entity in the world of transmigration since the beginningless past (anādi-bhava-bhāvi-bhāvabhiniveśa-vāsanā-paripāka-prabhāvāt).

Therefore, Yogācāras consider that an entity (bhāva) consists of cognition (jñānātmaka).

In this case also, [Yogācāras] discriminate between [II-1] those images (ākāra) [of cognition] which are real (tattvika); [II-2] those

(202) cf. MAK. XLIV. MAV P61b1 D64b7

ji ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi // rnam pa dag ni snaṅ ba yaṅ // nor bas sgyu ma'i raṅ bzin 'dra //

MAV P61b3 D65a2
dmigs pa bden par 'dod pa'i śes pa la snaṅ ba'i rnam pa 'di dag kyaṅ thogs ma med pa'i srid par 'byuṅ ba can dōṅs po la mūṅ par žen pa'i bag chags yoṅs su smin pa'i mthus snaṅ ṅo //

— 47 —
which are satisfactory as long as they are not examined by any means (avicāraika-ramya) such as reflection (pratibimba), etc.

[II-1] Let us suppose that those images (ākāra) are real.

[II-1-A] In that case, since cognition (vijñāna) is inseparable from images (ākāra) which are real (tattvika) and manifold (aneka), it (viz., cognition) would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (ākāra-svarūpavat), how could it [cognition] be a unity (ekta)?

On the other hand, if cognition (vijñāna) can be defined as having a unity (ekatva) since it is perceptible for only one moment (sakṛt), then it is hard to avoid the problem that images (ākāra) would become a unity (ekatva), like the nature of cognition (vijñāna-svarūpavat), because they are inseparable from a unitary cognition (eka-jñāna).

[objection:] It is so.

[II-1-A-1]
This is incorrect.

This is because if one image (ākāra) manifests as a thing which has a quality which is unstable, etc. (calanatvādi-viśiṣṭa), then the rest of the images also would have the very same nature (tathā-vidhā eva) as the former image (pūrvākāra), because both of them would have an undifferentiated nature (avyatiricyamāna-mūrti-svabhāvatva).

Therefore, it is contradictory that (cognition which has a unitary nature) perceives a manifold of images (vaictryākāra).

Hence, because it follows that images (ākāra), which are not only various (nānātva) but also particular (aikāntika), are incompatibly combined with each other (paraspara-viruddha-dharmādhyāsa-yogā) as both a unitary and a manifold nature (ekānekatvavyayoḥ), then the variety (nānātva) of both images (ākāra) and cognition (vijñāna) could be proven as a highest truth (pāramārthika).

Because of this, the acknowledged doctrine of non-duality (abhyupagatādvayanaya) would be disproved.

[II-1-A-2] If [you] think that [we] never fall into such mistakes as
stated above because oneness (eka) is not understood as manifoldness (citratvā) on the ground that images (ākāra) such as the color blue, etc., like happiness (sukha), etc. are none other than a thing which consists of immediate experience (anubhava), and if [you] explain that diverse cognitions (vijñāna) of the same kind (samānajātiya) occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijātiya-jñānavat), you would commit another mistake (doṣa).

This is because the cognition (vijñāna), which is thought to be situated in the center (madhya), is acknowledged to be like an atom (anu) which is surrounded [by other atoms].

We can divide it [into two cases]: [II-1-A-2-1] Whether, [like an atom in the center], it faces by nature the other [cognitions] in the very same manner that it faces a single (eka) [cognition], or [II-1-A-2-2] whether it faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner?

[II-1-A-2-1] Let us suppose that it faces [by a single nature the other cognitions] in the very same manner [that it faces a single cognition]. Since [the cognition in the center] is not situated in the point where it could be surrounded by the others, it is incorrect that others would mutually occupy the different point.

Therefore, it would be impossible that a thing which does not exist as possessing the directions (digbhāga) of front and back (pūrvāparā), etc. manifests in the form of a circle (maṇḍala) of blue, etc.

[II-1-A-2-2] Let us suppose that [it faces other surrounding cognitions] in the very same manner [that it faces a single cognition].
tions] in a different manner.

How can it [viz., cognition] have a single nature (ekatā) since the distinction of a thing (vastubheda) is defined by means of it having its own nature (svabhāvabhedā)

Therefore, the errors (doṣa) which were found in the case of examining an atom (paramāṇu) would pertain to this case, also.

[II-1-A-2-3]

[bjection:] Cognitions (jñāna) do not have a front part or a back part (paurvāparya) which consists of points (deṣa) because of their immateriality (amūrtatvāt).

Therefore, how can cognitions (jñāna) be located in the center (madhya) in the very same way as atoms (aṇuvat)?

[Answer:] Although your opinion [that cognition is different from an atom by nature] is true (satya), it (viz., your statement) contains another kind of error (doṣa).

Cognitions (jñāna), since you have admitted that images (ākāra) manifesting extension (deṣa-vītāna) are true (satyatva), would be regarded as if they manifested with extension (deṣa-vītāna) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do no occupy space (adeṣa). Otherwise, even though the appearance of manifold cognition (aneka-jñāna) is allowed, a thing which manifests by appearing as an extension (deṣa-vītāna) like [an atom] would be false (mithyā).

(208) MAK. XLIX MAV P62b7-8 D66a3-4

(209) (W) deṣavītānapādaḥ [V] deṣavitānāsthānenaotpādaḥ
In this case, allowing the appearance (*utpāda*) of manifold cognition (*aneka-vijñāna*) would be definitely meaningless (*vyartha*) [if the various manifestations of cognitions do not mean their having extension].

And the perception of the color blue, etc. [without extension] being different from manifestation (*pratibhāsa*) of the color blue, etc. which has extension (*deśa-vitāna*) would not be true (*satya*).

And if they (viz., the color blue together with extension) are unreal (*alīkatva*), what else would be true (*satya*)?

Therefore, whatsoever is this?

[II–1–A–2–4]

[Objection:] Atoms (*āṇu*) have material bodies (*mūrta*), while cognition (*vijñāna*) is immaterial (*amūrta*).

In this case (viz., of cognition) how is there the very same error (*doṣa*) that [the atomic theory] has?

[Answer:] There is never an error (*doṣa*) [if we treat a fault concerning atoms as one of cognition].

This is because the color blue, etc. which manifests as a unity (*eka*) without intervals (*nairantaryā*) is definitely understood as being composed of atoms (*paramāṇu–ātmaka*).

Otherwise, a thing which is thought of as the nature of cognition

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(210) [W] alīkatve [V] alīkakatve
(211) MAP P109b³ D105a³
rdul phra rab rnams ni lus can yin la rnam par šes pa ni lus can ma¹ yin pa ma yin nam / de ji ltar na 'dir ſes pa 'di ſiṅ du 'gyur sšam pa la / 1. P om.
(212) MAV P63a³–⁴ D66a⁶
štön po la sogs pa bar med par snaṅ ba de ſiṅ kha cig ni rdul phra rab kyi bdag ſiṅ du khas len /
(213) MAP P109b⁴–⁶ D105a⁴–⁵
miṅ tsam tha dad pa 'ba'a žig tu zed kyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pa'i mtshan

— 52 —
(saṁvid-rūpa) is definitely distinguished as name-only (nāma-mātra). However, there is no difference between a thing which is characterized by continuous extension (deśa-nairantarya) [and an atom]. A thing which exists by virtue of function (pravṛtti) as name-only (nāma-mātra) is not subject to the same error (tulya-doṣatā) [that an atom is], but that which exists as continuous extension is subject to the same error.

Its [continuous extension] is also an attribute of a thing which is distinguished as name-only.

Therefore, why shouldn't the same error [as in atomic theory] be found [in cognition]?

[II-1-A-2-5] (Conclusion)

[Objection:] Because, even so, the cognition (jñāna) and the cognizable (jneya) are not similar (vaisādṛṣṭya), and refutation (dūṣaṇa) pertaining to the cognizable (jneya) is not admitted for the cognition (jñāna).

[Answer:] In this case also, we reply that if multiple cognition (anekajñāna) occurs at the same time (yugapad), discrimination (vikalpa) which is the recognition of an object (viṣaya) such as a pot or cloth, etc. would not be secondary (kramabhāvin).

[Therefore, discrimination (vikalpa) would come to be produced with perception at the same time.] It is impossible to say that only cognitions, having no thought-construction (nirvikalpaka-jñāna), occur at the same time (yugapad) since
discrimination (vikalpa) is produced by means of a determined immediate experience (anubhavaniścaya).

Therefore, these imaginary thoughts (kalpanā) are indeed not produced as something with an unknowable nature (asanāvidita-rūpa) of their own (svayam).

So [if multiple cognition is produced at the same time, as you say], it would mean that a direct experience (anubhava) is determined immediately (sakṛt) [including imaginary thoughts]. Accordingly, it could not be that discrimination (vikalpa) is perceived as a secondary thing (kramabhāvin) [but that this discrimination is simultaneously determined along with perception].

As a result [your statement] involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (pratyakṣa-virodha).

[This is because direct perception (pratyakṣa) is defined as a cognition having no discrimination.]

[II-1-B]

[II-1-B-1]

[Objection:] A single cognition definitely (ekam eva vijñānam) grasps manifold nature (citra-rūpa) just as in the case of the manifestation (pratibhāsa) of a jewel which is dark-blue in color (mecaka-maṇi).

[Answer:] Your statement is incorrect.

The reason is as follows:

[Major:] Whatever is manifold (citra) is not single (eka) : e. g.

(214) NB, I. 4. ibid. Note. 43.
(215) MAV P63a4–5 D66a7
(216) MAP P110a3–4 D105b1–3
notion (pratyaśa) in the plural stream of consciousness (nānā-su-māna).

[Minor:] This cognition (vijñāna) is manifold (citra).

[Conclusion: This cognition is not single.]

This inference is based on the principle of the perception of incompatibility (vīruddhopalabdhi).

The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddha), since [cognition] is perceived as a manifold nature (citrava).

Neither is this contradictory (vīruddha), since it is present in homogeneous examples (sapakṣa).

[II-1-B-2]

[Objection:] Why should manifoldness (citra) and unity (ekatva) be incompatible (virodha), since manifoldness (citravā) manifests as a unity (ekatva)?

[Answer:] [Your statement is not correct] because there is no other
meaning of the word “manifoldness” (citra) except for “a plural nature” (nānā-svabhāva). Because variation (nānā) and singless (ekatva) constitute an invariable relation (nāntariyakatva), which are opposites by their own nature (anonya-svarūpa-vyavachela); [thus, these two] are contradictory [terms] (virodha) which are mutually exclusive (paraspara-pariḥāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa). As a result, incompatibility (virodha) is established [in your statement].

If the two, which are contradictory (viruddha), exist as a single nature (eka-svabhāvatva), then all the universe (sakalat viśvam) would be a single substance (ekam dravyam).

Therefore, [given such reasoning] it would be hard to avoid (durnivāra) [a conclusion] that such would mean that [one thing] has both the characteristics of production (utpāda) and destruction (vināśa), etc. at the same time (saha).

Otherwise, the singleness (eka) is none other than name-only (neimamatra). Neither is this logical reason (hetu) inconclusive (anaikāntikatā), since there is no dispute (vivāda) with respect to name (nāma).

You must not say that, first of all, the manifestation (pratibhāsa) of a jewel which has a dark-blue color (mecaṁa-maṇi) is established as an example (drṣṭānta).

Even in this case, this is because [a thing which consists of a single nature] is incapable of such things as manifesting (avabhasitva) plural nature (nānā-rūpa) on the ground that a single nature is not pervaded (avyāptatva) by various natures (nānā-rūpata) [since these two are mutually exclusive.]

Therefore, [that reasoning] involves the same kind of criticism (tulya-paryanuyogatva) [that was stated above.]
[II-1-B-3] (Conclusion 1)

[Objection:] It is not recognized that by direct perception (pratyakṣa) such things as the color blue, which appear before us (pratibhāsamāna), are distinguished (bheda) from a thing which exists in another place (deśa) and time (kāla).

This is because X is not perceived as different (bhinna) from Y because of the absence of the manifestation (apratibhāsana) of two [distinguishable] things [in direct perception (pratyakṣa) at the same time].

Even if X is not differentiated from Y, since they manifest at the same time and place (samāna-kāla-deśa), there is such a cognition (pratyaya). This is because direct perception (pratyakṣa) can not ascertain [distinction] on account of the absence of thought-construction (nirvikalpa).

Therefore, a cognition which is both manifold and non-dual at the same time (citrādvaya) manifests as a single nature (eka-rūpa) in direct perception (pratyakṣa), since distinction (bheda) between the things perceived (grāhya) and between both the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhaka) are not mutually perceived.

[Answer:] Your statement is refuted as follows: This is because unity (eka) is incompatible with manifoldness (citratva).

[II-1-B-4] (Conclusion 2)

[Objection:] Manifoldness (citra) also is single (eka) since concentration (yoga) and tranquility (kṣema) are not distinguished (abhinna).

[Answer:] Your statement is not reasonable (ayukta). This is because it is contradictory (virodha) that something (viz., manifoldness) has a single nature (ekatva) because of possessing a mutually distinctive nature (vyāvṛtta-rūpatva). And that concentration (yoga) and tranquility
(kṣema) are not distinguished (abhinna) from each other is not ascertained by direct perception (pratyakṣa).

When the natures of concentration (yoga) and tranquility (kṣema) are identical (abhinna), some other nature different from its own nature (svarūpānyatva) also appears as a simultaneous manifestation (yugapad-pratibhāsana) [as long as a manifold nature manifests in direct perception (pratyakṣa) at the same time according to your theory]. Therefore, why shouldn’t manifestation of distinction (bheda-pratibhāsa) exist?

And if you imagine that it is non-dual (advaita), since distinction (bheda) is not ascertained (agraha), then X is not distinguished from Y as long as there is no distinction (abheda). Therefore, any sort of duality (dvaita) is not conceived because this type of characteristic (evaṃ-rūpa) is not recognized. If the real entity in its general aspect (vastu-mātra), apart from distinction and non-distinction (bhedābheda), is recognized, how on earth does the manifoldness (citra) of such things as the color blue manifest?

If the manifestation (pratibhāsa) of manifoldness (citra) is acknowledged, the very thing would be said to be a manifestation of distinction (bheda-pratibhāsa) in this world (loka). Therefore, how can distinction be denied (bheda-palpa)?

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