An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśīla’s
*Śarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

Seitetsu Moriyama

**CONTENTS**

Abbreviation

I. Contents of Kamalaśīla’s *Śarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi*. Part IV.

II. A Translation of Kamalaśīla’s *Śarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

III. Tibetan Text of the *Śarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla. Part IV.

**ABBREVIATIONS**

AAPV: *Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā Prajñāpāramitāvyakhyā* of Haribhadra.

AbD: *Abhidharmadīpa* ed. by P.S. Jaini.

Ad: *Āṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, SOR XLVI.


Prasp: Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti.

PV: Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā of Dharmakīrti.


SDNS IV: An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśila’s Sarvadharmahṃśvabhāvasiddhi Part IV.


SOR: Serie Orientale Roma.

SRS: Samādhirājasūtra, BST. No. 2.

T: Taishō.

V: AAPV, ed. by P.L. Vaidya, BST. NO. IV.

W: AAPV, ed. by U. Wogihara.
I. Contents of Kamalasila's Sarvadharmanihsvabhavasiddhi Part IV.

II. Proof by Scripture .................................. P330a^3 D286a^5
II.1. All existence is devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva).
      —the philosophical position of the Mādhyamika
II.2. Reality seen from the standpoint of conventional truth (samvṛtyā) and Reality from the viewpoint of highest truth (paramārthatas) ......................... P330a^3 D286a^6
II.2.A. Examination of reality seen from the standpoint of conventional truth
II.2.A.1. Refutation of the theory that cognition possesses the images of an object within itself (sākāra-jñāna-vāda).
II.2.A.1.1. Cognition is real from the standpoint of conventional truth, but is also devoid of intrinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth.—refutation of the theory of Vijñānavādin ......................... P331b^1 D287a^4
II.2.A.1.2. Refutation of the theory of Sautrāntika advocating that individual atoms (anu) are real, but aggregates of many atoms are only an empirical reality (samvṛtisat).
      ......................................................... P332b^6 D288a^3
II.2.A.2. Refutation of the theory that cognition does not possess the image of the object within itself (nirākāra-jñānavāda).—for instance, the theory of Sarvāstivādin
      ......................................................... P333b^1 D288b^2
II.2.A.3. Cognition is real from the standpoint of conventional truth ............................................ P333b^2 D228b^3
II.2.B. Examination of reality as seen from the viewpoint of highest truth
II.2.B.1. Examination of the position of Dharmakīrti who advocates that that which has power to produce effects (artha-kriyā-samartha) is an ultimate reality (paramārthasat), while everything else is only an
empirical reality (saṁvṛtisat). .......... P333b⁵ D288b⁵

II.2.B.2. Refutation of the position of Alikākāravādins who advocate that the nondual cognition (advayajñāna) is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhyagṛahakākāra). ...................... P333b⁷ D288b⁶

II.2.B.2.1. Impossibility of proving nondual cognition by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). ........ P334a¹ D288b⁷

II.2.B.2.2. Lack of relation of identity (tādātmya) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (ālikākāra). ...... P334a³ D289a¹

II.2.B.2.3. Lack of causal relation (tadutpatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images. . P334a⁶ D289a²

II.2.B.2.4. Unreasonableness of the notion that nondual cognition possesses eternal (nitya) nature. ........ P334b³ D289a⁶

II.2.B.2.5. Unreasonableness seen from the viewpoint of highest truth of the notion that the nondual cognition is transient (anītya). ......................... P334b⁵ D289a⁷

II.2.B.2.6. There is no third alternative. ............... P334b⁶ D289a⁷

II.2.B.2.7. All existence is devoid of intrinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth. .............. P334b⁶ D289b¹

II.3. The meditative practice of niḥsvabhāva.

II.3.1. Attainment of the removal of emotive hinderance (kleśāvaraṇa) and intellectual hinderance (jñeyāvaraṇa) by means of meditation on voidness (śūnyatā)...........

.......................... P334b⁸ D289b²

II.3.2. The practice of wisdom (prajñā) accompanied with skillful means (upāya) on the path of śūnyatā for bodhisattvas who intend to attain the rank of omniscience (sarvajñā). ............... P336a⁴ D290a⁵

II.4. Conclusion ........................................ P337b⁶ D291a⁴
II. PROOF BY SCRIPTURE

[II.1] [II.2]

The notion that all existence is devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) can also be established by Scripture [as well as by the logical proof which is discussed above]. Hence it is taught in the Hastikasya-sūtra as follows:

“It is impossible that any kind of existence obtains an arising (utpāda). Ordinary people seeks arising in terms of non-arising.”

It is also declared in the Ārya-ratnākara-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra as follows:

That which is devoid of any intrinsic nature is said to be without its own nature. How can it become a condition (paccaya) for [the arising of] others? Does what is devoid of

---

(101) BhK I. p200

hastikakṣye coktam /
na kaścit labhyate bhāvo yasyotpādaśya saṁbhavah / asaṁbhaveṣu dharmeṣu bālah saṁbhavam icchati / iti
Nayatrayapradipa (NP) P8b

gah la'ān ni rṇed mi 'gyur // dhos po med pa'i ū bo la // byis pa rṇams ni 'byuh bar 'dod // ces gsuṅs pa

(102) PrasP p90

Āryaratnākaraśūtra / yasya naiva hi saṁbhāvu labhyati so'saṁbhāvu parapaccayā kathaṁ / asaṁbhāvu paraṁ kīṁ janīṣyati eṣa hetu sugatena desītaḥ //
MAV P70a—b D72a

dkon mchog 'byuṅ gnas kyi mdo las kyaṅ // gah la raṅ bžin yod pa ma yin te // raṅ bžin med pas gzān rkyen^2 ji litar 'gyur // raṅ bžin med pas^3 gzān gyis ji lar bskyed^4 // rgyu 'di bde bar gṣegs pas bstan pa yin / 2 gṣegs so // 1. P om. 2. P has skyen 3. P has par 4. P has skye 5. P has/ NP, P8b

dkon mchog 'byuṅ gnas las / gah gi ḍhos po ŋid ni yod min pa // de ḍhos gzān gyi rkyen du ji litar 'gyur / ḍhos med gzān ni ji ŋig skyed 'gyur žes / rgyu 'di bde bar gṣegs pas bstan pa yin žes bṣad pa

---

(101) Much of the original text is not legible due to wear and tear on the page. The translation and transcription are based on the readable parts of the text.
intrinsic nature produce any other existence? The reason is taught by the Sugata.

It is also stated in the Ārya-sāgaraṇāgarāja-pariprcechā-nāmamahāyāna-sūtra:

"The past is void. The future is also void. Arising (utpāda), destruction (vināśa) and abiding (sthiti) is void. This is neither existent nor non-existent. All existence is devoid of any intrinsic nature."

It is also declared in the Samādhīrāja-sūtra:

"If one cuts up the fruit of a fresh banana to obtain the core, there is neither a core inside nor outside. In the same way, one must understand all existence."

Furthermore it is stated in the Āryabuddhasāṅgīti-sūtra:

"What is the primary inquiry? What is fundamental here? The
following reply is given: non-arising is the primary issue. Making an inquiry with regards to this is what is meant by a primary examination."

It is also said in the same scripture:

“All existence has the doorway of the letter “tsa” [which represents contemplation]. The reason is that they are dissociated from death and birth. And all existence has the doorway of intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The reason is that they are devoid of intrinsic nature.

It is also taught in the pitāputrasamāgama:

“All existence is equal, because in everything there is equality through the threefold temporal relation (traikālya). They are devoid of intrinsic nature in the past, in the future and in the present.”

Furthermore it is also proclaimed in the same scripture:

(105) BhK I. p19914-18

āryabuddhasaṅgita coktam / katamā yoniśāḥ prccāḥ / katamā yoniḥ / āha / anutpādo yoniḥ / tasya prccāḥ yoniśāḥ prccāḥ / punar atraivoktam / akāramukhāḥ sarvadharmāś cyutypattivigataḥ / abhāvamukhāḥ sarvadharmāḥ / svabhāvaśūnyatām upādāya iti/

NP P9a1-3

chos yāñ dag par sdud pa las kyañ / tshul bzin 'dri ba ni gañ tshul bzin ma yin par 'dri ba ni gañ že na / smras pa ma skyes pa ni tshul bzin te / de 'dra ba ni tshul bzin du 'dri ba'o žes gsuñs pa dañ / yañ de ņid laschos thams cad ni tsa'i sgo ste 'chi 'pho dañ skye ba dañ bral ba'o / chos thams cad ni ho bo ņid kyi sgo ste / ho bo ņid stoh pa ņid ņe bar bzuñ bas so žes gsuñs pa dañ /

(106) BhK I. p2007-9

pitāputrasamāgama coktam / sarve ete dharmāḥ sarve samās traikālyasamatayā / aṭṭhe 'dhvani sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvarahitā yāvat pratyutpanne’ dhvani / itī /

NP P9a3-5

yab dañ sras mjal ba las kyañ / chos 'di dag thams cad ni dus gsum mñam pa ņid kyis mñam ste / 'das pa'i dus kyis chos thams cad ni ho bo ņid dañ bral ba'o / ma 'ōhs pa dañ da ltar byuñ ba'i chos thams cad ni ho bo ņid kyis stoh pa'o žes gsuñs pa dañ / yañ de ņid las gsal bar mdzad pa ni / chos thams cad ni ho bo ņid kyis stoh pa ste / chos gañ dños po med pa de ni 'das pa ma yin / ma 'ōhs pa ma yin da ltar byuñ ba ma yin no / de ci'i phyir že na / dños po yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir 'das pa'o žes rnam par 'jogs par mi nus / ma 'ōhs pa ma yin / da ltar byuñ bar 'jogs par nus pa ma yin no žes bya ba gsuñs pa yin no //
“All existence is devoid of intrinsic nature. Whatever does not have intrinsic nature does not to the past, to the future, and to the present.

[Objection:] How is it so?

[Answer:] It is declared that [all existence] cannot be called past, future, or present.”

It is also detailed in the Āryasatyaadvayāvatāra-sūtra:

“Oh Mañjuśrī, what is the right meditative practice (samyakpraja-yoga)?

Mañjuśrī replied in the following manner:

Oh Devaputra, the five evil deeds that lead to hell (pañcānantaryya) seen from the viewpoint of highest truth, suchness (tathatā), the essence of supreme reality (dharma-dhātu), and absolute non-arising (atyantājāti) are equal from the viewpoint of highest truth. From the viewpoint of highest truth something defiled is equal to something pure. And anything pure is equal to all existence from the viewpoint of highest truth. [Devaputra asked:] Oh Mañjuśrī, by what kinds of

---

(107) NP P9a6—b1

"phags pa gnis la 'jug pa las kyi / ya 'jam dpal ya 'dag pa'i sbyor ba gan zig yin / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / lha'i bu don dam pa dañ / de bzin ' nid dañ / chos kyi dbyiñs dañ / skye ba med pa gan dañ mnam pa mthams med pa lha po de dañ mnam mo 'zes bya ba la sogs pa kun nas ron moñs pa dañ / rnam par byañ ba'i chos thams cad mnam par ' nid du rgya cher bsad nas smras pa / yañ 'jam dpal don dam pa'i bar gyi mnam pa ' nid gan gis rnam par byañ ba mnam pa ' nid yin pa chos thams cad de dañ mnam pa yin nam / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / lha'i bu don dam par chos thams cad ni ma skyes pa'i mnam pa ' nid dañ / don dam par chos thams cad ni 'sin tu ma byuñ ba'i mnam pa ' nid dañ / don dam par (107-2...): chos thams cad dhos po med pa'i mnam pa ' nid kyis thams cad mnam pa ' nid yin no 'zes rgya cher gsuñs pa dañ... "107-1,-2"

(107-1) Māl P176a5-7 D161b5-7

"phags pa bden pa gnis bstan pa las kyi / 'jam dpal mnam pa ' nid gan gis don dam par2 rnam par byañ ba'i bar du gan dañ mnam pa / don dam par chos thams cad kyi de dañ mnam mam / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / lha'i bu don dam par chos thams cad 'sin tu 'byuñ ba med par mnam pa ' nid dañ / don dam par chos thams cad 'sin tu skye ba med par mnam pa ' nid3 dañ / '4 5...don dam par...5 chos thams cad dhos po med par mnam pa ' nid kyis don dam par chos thams cad mnam pa ' nid do 'zes gsuñs so // 1. Pom. 2. D has pa 3.4.5. Pom."
equality do you mean that all existence is equal to something pure from the viewpoint of highest truth? 
Mañjuśrī replied: [we say] all existence is equal with respect to such equality as the fact that everything is not produced, that all existence is absolutely non-arising, and that all existence is non-existent from the viewpoint of highest truth.

It is also declared the Āryasarvabuddhaviśayāvatārajñānālokālārṇkāra-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra:

The Tathāgata is always non-arising. All existence is equal to the Sugata. Because ordinary people adhere the marks (nimitta), they must cultivate the truth that [everything] in this world is non-existent.

The Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra also teaches:

Oh Subhuti! [All existence] from matter (rūpa) to consciousness

---

(107-2) BhK I. pp19919—2001
Āryasatyadvayavibhāge cāntrapadasamatayā sarvadharmā-ṇām samatā bhavati /

(108) T. 12. No. 357 如来莊嚴智慧光明入一切仏境界経 p242b16-17

如来常不生

世間無実法

やがて

No. 359 仏説大乗入諸仏境界智光明莊嚴経 p257a4-5

如来無生法本常

一切法與善逝等

新

如来不生法本常 一切法與善逝等

如来莊嚴智慧光明入一切仏境界経  p242b16-17

No. 359 是来莊嚴智慧光明入一切仏境界経  p257a4-5

(109) BhK I. p2001-4
prajñāpāramitāyāṁ coktam / rūpaṁ, subhūte, rūpasvabhāvena sūnyam yāvad vijñānāṁ vijñānasvabhāvena sūnyam iti svalakṣaṇasūnyaiṁ upādāya iti

NP P9b1-2
sāṁ ryaś thams cad ky i yul la 'jug pa ye šes snaḥ ba'i rgyan las kyaḥ / rtag tu skye med chos ni de bzin gsėgs / chos rnam thams cad bde bar gṣegs dañ 'dra // byis pa'i blo can mtshan mar 'dzin pa rnam // 'jig rten dag na med pa'i chos la spyod ces gsuhs pa dañ /

Cf. Ad. p784-5

rūpaṁ subhūte prakṛtiśūnyam, vedanā-saṁjñā-saṁskāra-vijñānāṁ subhūte prakṛtiśūnyam.
(vījñāna) is devoid of intrinsic nature because everything is devoid of its own characteristics (svalakṣaṇa).

It is also taught in the Ratnakaranaṇḍa:

Oh Maṇjuśrī, why are the teachings of Buddha not teachings? Or, Oh Venerable Subhūti, why is it that nothing is well established from the viewpoint of highest truth with respect to the teachings of Buddha? That which is not established must be said to be neither existent nor non-existent. Therefore, the Blessed One declared that all existence is non-existent.

[II.2.A.]
[II.2.A.1.]
[II.2.A.1.1.]

[Objection of Vijñānavādin:]

All kinds of tenets that teach [all existence to be devoid of
intrinsic nature] are taught [by the Blessed One] by taking the imaginary constructed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) into consideration, just as it is taught in the Scripture.

[Answer:] If [your view] is correct, still you must explain what this imaginary constructed nature is.

[Objection:] Even though [the imaginary constructed nature] is denied by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), it is recognized as real by ordinary people.

[Answer:] If so, ordinary people, from the viewpoint of highest truth, still hypostatize (samāropa), for example, the arising of such things as illusion (māyā), which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully (avicāraikāramya), that is to say,
those which are produced by dependent origination
(*pratītyaśamutpaṇṇa*).

Why do you not regard those things which are produced by
dependent origination as having imaginary constructed natures
in the same way as previously stated, since they are denied by
valid means of cognition?

Otherwise [if that which is produced by dependent origination is
real], how could you not regard the external object as real in the
sense of highest truth, since [it is stated by the Blessed One
(Bhagavat)] that the external object is devoid of imaginary
constructed nature.

[Objection:] It is impossible to regard [that which is produced by
dependent origination] as real from the viewpoint of highest
truth because it is denied by valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).

[Answer:] If so, you must not regard arising, etc., [of cognition (*vi-
ḍjñāna*)] as [real in the sense of highest truth] since they are
negated by the valid means of cognition.

[Objection:] Such things as arising [of cognition] cannot be denied by
the valid means of cognition because they are acknowledged as
common sense (*prasiddha*).

[Answer:] Your statement is not reasonable. This is because,
[according to your statement, such things as the arising of
cognition] are not real in the sense of highest truth but real only
in the sense of conventional truth. Accordingly, this is also the
same case as we have already examined.

---

(114) Māl P175a3-4 D160b6

'on te tshad mas gnod pa'i phir de ltar rnam par bsad par mi bya'o že na / de'i
tshe rnam par šes pa la yañ de lta de ltar bsad par mi bya ste / de yañ phyi'i don
bzin du tshad mas gnod pa yin pa'i phyir ro //

---

- 48 -
The Blessed One taught as follows:

The arising of existances is acknowledged from the standpoint of conventional truth, while it is devoid of intrinsic nature from the point of view of highest truth. Inverted ideas with respect to what is devoid of intrinsic nature are said to be correct from the point of view of conventional truth.

If it is not so, the external objects would also not be denied by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa) because they are recognized as a common sense. Therefore, only what is acknowledged by the valid means of cognition is reasonable, while all others are not reasonable.

Accordingly, the Blessed One proclaimed in the Sāṃdhinirmocana...
sūtra, etc., as follows:

I declare that all existences are devoid of intrinsic nature for the purpose of explaining three kinds of non-substantiality with regard to three kinds of nature.\footnote{116}

This teaching is not inconsistent with [our Yogācāra-mādhyamika philosophy], since it is not inconsistent [for Yogācāra-mādhyamika proponents] to establish three kinds of nature (tri-svabhāva). The reason is that those things which are acceptable only so long as they are not examined carefully (avicāraikaramya)—that is to say, produced by dependent origination (pratityasamutpanna)—have a dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva). Therefore, the arisings [of cognition] are devoid of intrinsic nature in that all things are produced by virtue of conditions (pratyaya) from the standpoint of conventional truth just like illusion.\footnote{117, 118}
Thus, to superimpose intrinsic nature on such things as arising from the point of view of highest truth is an imaginary construction (parikalpitasvabhāva). [The imaginary construction] is devoid of intrinsic nature of essential property (lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā) since it is not established to possess its own nature by valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), just like in the case of that which is conceptually constructed.

Interdependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) devoid of imaginary construction (parikalpitasvabhāva)—as stated above—is ultimate nature (parinispaṇnasvabhāva).

The reason is that [ultimate nature] is always established in that which is proven from the viewpoint of highest truth by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). [Ultimate nature] is also devoid of intrinsic nature from the point of view of highest truth because it has general characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) in that is pervades all existences. In this respect, too, [our Yogācāra-mādhyamika philosophy] which advocates all existences [to be devoid of intrinsic nature] does not have contradictions at all.

---

(119) Māl P163b⁶-⁸ D151a²-³
gzhan gi dbang gi ho bo niḥ sgyu ma la sogs pa daṅ khyad par med pa de niḥ la rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa la sogs pa don dam pa pa'i raṅ gi ṇo bo sgro 'dogs pa¹ gaṅ yin pa de ni kun brtags pa'i ho bo niḥ do // de yah ji ltar kun brtags pa'i mtshan niḥ du ma grub pa'i phyir mtshan niḥ bo bo niḥ med pa niḥ du rnam par gzag² go //³ 1. P has btags pa 2. P has bzag 3. P has/

(120) Māl P164a⁶-⁷ D151b¹-²
chos thams cad don dam pa rtag tu raṅ bṣin gys ṇo bo niḥ med pa kho nar gnas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni yogs su grub pa'i ṇo bo niḥ yin te / de ni rtag tu sgro btags pa med pa niḥ du grub pa'i phyir ro // de yah tshad mas yah dag par grub pa'i bdag niḥ kyis don dam pa ņes kyaṅ bya la ṇo bo niḥ med pas rab tu phyi ba'i phyir ṇo bo niḥ med pa niḥ kyaṅ yin no // de'i phyir 'di ni don dam pa ṇo bo niḥ med pa yin no //
Then, the Blessed One proclaimed in the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, etc., that such things as cognition (*vijñāna*) are a reality in order to have disciples (*vineya*) who adhere to arising (*utpāda*), ceasing (*nirodha*) and so forth discard nihilistic idea. The aim of this teaching must be understood not from the viewpoint of highest truth.

It is also declared in the *Āryadharmaśaṅgīti*:

Son of a noble family (*kula-putra*)! Those who live in this world adhere to arising (*utpāda*) and ceasing (*nirodha*). Then, although Tathāgata—who has great compassion on them—proclaimed from the standpoint of conventional truth that there are arising and ceasing in order to have those who live in this world discard nihilistic idea. **Note (121)**

---

(121) Cf. Māl P166b⁴-⁶ D153b¹-³

(122) Cf. Māl P164a⁵-⁶ D151a⁶-⁷

---

Some other scholars advocate that the theory of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional truth (*sāṁyrtvā*), since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind [or internal world] cannot be established. Therefore, although the Blessed One (*Bhagavat*), for the purpose of indicating the above meaning, teaches that existents are product of the mind-only, he does not teach that it [viz., the existent of mind-only] is reasonable from the point of view of highest truth (*paramārthata*). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the mind (*citta*) [as well as color-form (*rūpa*)] is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).
An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśīla’s Sarvadharmasvabhāvasiddhi Part IV.

the basis of their fear, there is actually nothing that arises in this world.\(^{(122)}\)

Accordingly, it is also taught in the Testimony (āgama):

All existences are devoid of intrinsic nature from the viewpoint of highest truth.\(^{(123)}\)

\(^{(122)}\) BhK I. p199, 10-14

dharmasaṁgītā / . . . . / utpādanirodhaḥbhīnivistāha kulaputra lokasaṁnivesah / tasmaḥ tathāgate mahākārūṇika lokasyottṛśapadapariharārthaḥ vyavakāravāsād uktavān utpadyate nirudhyate ceti na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādhaḥ / iti /
Māl P167a1-2 D153b4-5

\(^{(123)}\) Cf. Māl P180a3-5 D165a6-b1

del bdar bdcon 'bras kyi mdo de dañ de las rnam pa du mar dḥos po ma lus pa ho bo ŋid\(^{-1}\) med pa ŋid\(^{-1}\) du gsal bar mḍazad mod kyi / . . . . . . de'i phyir bcom ldan 'bras kyi\(^{2}\) yan dag pa'i gsuṅ rab kyi tshul ŋes par ma zin pa rnam s kyis don dam pa'i lugs la rnam par sdañ bas re zig glu gi sgo nas ni chos thams cad ho bo ŋid med par sgrub\(^{3}\) par nus pa ni\(^{4}\) ma yin te \(^{5}\) žes sṃras pa gañ yin pa de bṣal\(^{6}\) ba\(^{7}\) yin no // 1. P om. 2. P has kyi 3. D has bsgrub 4. P om. 5. D om. 6. P has gsal 7. D has ma
Therefore, it is ascertained that to adhere to the arising of existences means delusion (viparyāsa), while, conversely, not to adhere means non-delusion.

[II.2.A.1.2.]
An inhabitant who is living in the world of beginningless transmigration (saṁsāra)—some person [viz., the Vaibhāṣika]—is forced to surrender to an evil spirit, i.e. attachment and persist as follows in order to advocate the unerring characteristic of the conventional truth and the highest truth:

When something is destroyed and something else is eliminated by examination, cognition of it does not arise, which then is an empirical existence (saṁvṛtisat) such as a pot or water. Everything else apart from that is an ultimate existence (paramārthasat).

This statement cannot be free from error. The reason is as follows:

The other scholars maintain that it is real only from the standpoint of conventional truth that such objects as pot is imagined to exist as a whole (avayavin). However, the logical reason leads to inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) since it is questioned why the cognition of a pot, etc., does not arise when the pot, etc., are broken if they are, indeed, real from the viewpoint of highest truth. This is because if you want to regard "destruction" and "extinction," then [the latter] is not identical with [the former]. Therefore, although the cognition of [those which are extinguished] is not produced, it is possible not to be produced because [such existence as pot] is unreal (alīka).

If you mean that [such existence as pot] is destroyed in part, then they

(124) Ak. VI. K°4
yatra bhinne na tad buddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat / ghaṭāmbuvat saṁvṛtisat
paramārthasad anyathā//
Cf. ABD K°304
buddhyā yasyekṣyate cihnah tatsuṁjiñeyan u caturvidham / paramārthena
saṁvṛtyā dvayanāpekṣayā'pi ca//
possess not only parts but also whole, hence, it is doubtful that the cognition [of such existence as pot] is not produced.

"When something else is eliminated by examination" becomes characterless since the meaning is very comprehensive. If a pot is examined by means of cognition, it is devoid of intrinsic nature as an ultimate reality in that it has parts. Likewise, atoms (paramāṇu) or cognition (vijñāna) would also be conventional existence because they are equivalent to the case of [a pot].

If atoms are material (mūrta), it should necessarily be acknowledged that they consist of quarters (deśa). Otherwise, such existence as mountain cannot be accumulated (saṅcita) since a differentiation of quarters such as eastern quarter or northern quarter would be groundless. If so, the atoms] would be none other than an empirical existence since they are devoid of intrinsic nature such as a pot in that they manifest having quarters [such as eastern quarter or northern quarter] in accordance with differentiation in quarters on account of their accumulation.

[II.2.A.2.]

Cognition (vijñāna) must be regarded as intrinsically possessing an image (ākāra). The reason is that if cognition—since it is equal in nature to those which have conception at all times—does not possess

(125) Cf. Māl P242b—243a D219a

(126) Cf. Māl P239b—240a D216b

— 55 —
image (ākāra), it cannot definitely have the determined nature in terms of perceiving objects.

[II.2.A.3.]
Accordingly, cognition would be of conventional existence since it possesses manifold nature just like external object (bāhyārtha) and since no intrinsic nature can be found, even though [Yogin] examines manifold images respectively.

Then, according to this definition of conventional truth, all existences can be established as that which manifest and possess conventional nature. Therefore, only our [Yogācāra-mādhyamika] theory is based on [the Buddha’s] doctrine.

It is declared in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra as follows:

When intrinsic nature is examined by means of cognition (buddhī), it cannot be established. Therefore, [all existents] are said to be ineffable (anabhilāpya) and devoid of intrinsic nature.

(127) LAS II-175 = X-167
buddhā vivecyamānānāṁ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate / tasmād1 anabhilāpyās te
niḥsvabhāvāṣ ca deśīrāḥ // 1. yasmād tad X-167
PVT P227a3-4
blo yis rnam par gzigs na go / ḥo bo ṅid ni gzuṅ du med // de phyir de dag brjod med ciṅ // ḥo bo ṅid kyaṅ med par bṣad ces gsuṅs so //
MAV P65a8–b1 D68a6
blo yis rnam par gzigs na ni // ḥo bo ṅid ni gzuṅ du med // de phyir de dag brjod med daṅ // ḥo bo ṅid kyaṅ med par bṣad //
NP P 10b5–6
blo yis rnam par brtags na ni / ḥo bo ṅid ni dmigs su med // de phyir de dag brjod med daṅ // dḥos po med par bstan pa yin ẓes gsuṅs pa yin no //
An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

[II.2.B.]

[II.2.B.1.]

Another scholar advocates as follows:

That which has power to produce effects (*arthā-kriyā-samārtha*) is an ultimate entity (*paramārtha*sat), while everything else is an empirical entity (*samvr̥tisat*). If, based upon proper convention, he advocates characteristics of an ultimate reality (*paramārtha*sat) which capture [the minds] of ordinary people (*prthajana*), then, this statement is reasonable. That is exactly why [that which has power to produce effects (*arthā-kriyā-samārtha*)] is definitely said to be a real entity as it is.

[II.2.B.2.]

[Objection:] That which possesses a unitary nature is a characteristic of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*sat).

[Answer:] In that case, you would be committing the same error as we [the Yogācāra-mādhyaṃkika] have previously pointed out, because it is impossible for all existence to be established as an efficient function (*arthā-kriyā*) from the viewpoint of highest truth. That is why [all existence] would be devoid of

---

(128) PV pratyakṣa V. 3.

\[ \text{arthakriyāsamārtham yat tad atra paramārtha*sat / anyat samvr̥tisat proktam te svasāmānyālaksāne} \]

(129) Cf. PV. pratyakṣa V. 358

\[ \text{anyathaikasya bhāvasya nānārūpāvabhāsānāh / satyam katham syur ākārās tādekatvasya hūnitaḥ} \]

\[ = \text{Māl P187b}^9 \text{D171b}^7 \]

\[ \text{de lta min na sna tshogs kyi /ḥo bo snaḥ ba'i dnos gcig la / rnam pa ji ltar bden 'gyur te / gcig pa ᆇid du ņams par 'gyur /} \]

Cf. AAPV W 6329–10

\[ \text{syād etad bhṛṇtagrāhyagrāhakākābhāvāt suptādyavasthāyām svasaṃvittir ekarūpā satyā bhavisyatrīti.} \]

[Objection:] When falling asleep, a self-cognition (*svasaṃvittি*) which is characterized by a single nature (*eka-rūpa*) would be true, since there are no images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*) which are erroneous (*bhṛṇta*).
characteristics.

[Objection] The philosophers of the other Buddhist school advocate:

It is a reality that cognition is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grāhya-grāhakākāra). And these dual images are a conventional reality (saṁvṛtisatya).

[Answer:] If you advocate that void (śūnyatā) means absolute negation (prasājya-rūpa), it is a reality that [the dual images] are nonexistent.

[II.2.B.2.1.]

If you state that [void] means a relational negation (paryudāsa-rūpa), the nature of cognition, apart from manifesting the dual [images], cannot be demonstrated to be a reality because it is unable to be established by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa).

[II.2.B.2.2.]

[Objection:] If the nondual cognition [which is devoid of the dual images] is not an ultimate entity (paramārtha-sat), what is the cause (kāraṇa) which manifests the dual [images]?

[Answer:] [Your inquiry] is not reasonable, for this [viz., the nondual cognition] and that [viz., the dual images] do not mutually have

(130) Cf. PV pratyākṣam V212, 213
paricchedo'ntar anvayaṁ bhāgo bahir iva sthitam / jñānasyābhedino bhedapratibhāso hy upapalavaḥ // tatraikasyāpy abhāvena dvayaṁ apy avahiyate / tasmāt tad eva tasyāpi tattvaṁ yā dvayaśūnyatā //

(131) Māl P181a1-2 D166a1-4
de las ma gtos pa'i 'bras bu gzan yod pa yaḥ ma yin te / 'di ltar khyed kyi ltar na gnis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur 'gyur ba žig na de ņid bsgrub par bya ba ņid kyi skabs yin pa'i phyir de yah ishad mas grub pa ma yin no //
There can be no other effect (kārya) independent of [nondual cognition], for according to your theory, [a self-cognition of] nonduality would be taken as an effect, however [self-cognition] itself should [first] be proven to have a cause and effect relationship. This also cannot be proven by means of a valid means of cognition (pramāṇa).

— 58 —
any intrinsic connection (pratibandha). The dual cannot be identical (tādātmya) to the nondual. The real and the unreal are contradictory in that they are characterized by their mutual exclusiveness (paraspara-parīhāra-sthitī-lakṣaṇa).

If the nature of cognition (jñāna) is real (satya), there is neither the relation of identity (tādātmya) nor causation (tadutpatti) between a thing which truly manifests and images (ākāra) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) and the unreal (alika), which are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parihāra-sthitī-lakṣaṇa), to have the relation of identity (tādātmya) and this does not explain how the real ia produced from something.

If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (pratibandha) between images (ākāra) [and cognition (vijñāna)] would not be a causal relation (tadutpatti) but a relation of identity (tādātmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously is a causal relation (hetuphalatva). For this reason, it is difficult to avoid the fact that these [images] would come to have a dependent nature (paratantratva), since these [images] are not separate from it [viz., cognition], like error (bhrāntivat). Otherwise, what would they be?

Cf. MAP P113a1-3, D108a3-4, MAV P64b6 D676b5-6
AAPV W63021-24

If the nature of cognition (jñāna) is real (satya), there is neither the relation of identity (tādātmya) nor causation (tadutpatti) between a thing which truly manifests and images (ākāra) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) and the unreal (alika), which are mutually exclusive (paraspara-parīhāra-sthitī-lakṣaṇa), to have the relation of identity (tādātmya) and this does not explain how the real ia produced from something.

If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (pratibandha) between images (ākāra) [and cognition (vijñāna)] would not be a causal relation (tadutpatti) but a relation of identity (tādātmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously is a causal relation (hetuphalatva). For this reason, it is difficult to avoid the fact that these [images] would come to have a dependent nature (paratantratva), since these [images] are not separate from it [viz., cognition], like error (bhrāntivat). Otherwise, what would they be?
[II.2. B. 2. 3.]

Moreover, there is no causal relationship (*tadutpatti*) [between the dual and the nondual] since that which is unreal cannot be produced by something else just like the horns of rabbit. Otherwise, this [dual images] would not have an imaginary constructed nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), but an interdependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). This is exactly why if [the dual images] have nothing to do with cognition, they could not be manifested just like the horns of rabbit.

If the nature of cognition apart from the dual [images] is still something other than the dual, then the dual [images] themselves would not be manifested because cognition cannot be characterized by the dual [images]. The nature of cognition is described as follows: it is illuminated by its own without depending upon other illumination just like the surface of space (*ākāśa*) or wick.

---

(133) cf. Māl P181a² D166a⁴

gñis su snaḥ ba gaḥ yin pa de ni ri boḥ gi rva daḥ 'dra baʾi phyir 'bras bu ma yin' no //

Just as the manifestation of dichotomy [viz., images of the perceived and the perceiver] is equivalent to the horns of a rabbit [viz., non-existent] [according to your theory, ] it cannot be an effect.

(134) AAPV W631⁸-¹⁰

atha mā bhūd ayaiḥ doṣa iti hetumattvam abhyaupagamyate tadā praṇītasyasamutpannatvād grāhyagrāhakākarayoḥ kalpitavābhāvāt paratantrāśvabhāvāḥ prasajyate yato na praṇītasyasamutpattier anyat parātantryam.

If, in order to avoid such kind of error (*doṣa*), you admit that an image (*ākāra*) has any cause (*hetu*), then it (viz., an image) would be dependently originated (*praṇītasyasamutpattavāt*). Therefore, both the images of the perceived and the perceiver (*grāhya-grāhakākāra*) are devoid of imaginary nature (*kalpitatvā*). They (viz., images) would have a dependent nature (*paratantra-śvabhāva*). This is because there is not a dependent nature (*paratantrya*) separate from dependent origination (*praṇītasyasamutpatti*).

(135) cf. Māl P180b⁶ D166a¹

gñis su snaḥ ba yah brdzun pa ŋid yin na ni šes paʾi ho bo gaḥ don dam par srid par 'gyur ba gzān ci ņig lus /

If the manifestation of the dichotomy [of cognition] is also unreal, how can the other kind of cognition, which is able to exist from the viewpoint of highest truth, exist?
The dual [images] are [manifested by their own just like cognition]: thus, it is not reasonable that they are not of the nature of cognition. If the dual [images] are nature of cognition and unreal [at the same time], it would obviously mean that the nature of cognition is unreal.

[II.2.B.2.4.]
In addition, it is not reasonable in the first place to assert that nondual cognition (jñāna) which is real possesses eternal (nitya) nature, for we have already detailed the inconsistency with regard to eternal existent. It would be of no use for seekers to endeavor to attain
liberation (mokṣa) in that the cultivation of contemplative tranquility (yoga) and other [practices] does not bear any result, since that which is eternal is devoid of any kind of attribute (viśeṣa).

[II. 2. B. 2. 5.]
It is also not reasonable from the viewpoint of highest truth to assert that [the nondual cognition which is real] is transient (anītya). The reason is that the production [of that which is transient], whether it possesses cause (kāraṇa) or not, is negated. That is why it is not reasonable for that which is non-arising to be transient.

[II. 2. B. 2. 6.]
There is also no other nature apart from [the eternal or the transient].

[II. 2. B. 2. 7.]
Therefore, it is reasonable from the point of view of highest truth (paramārthatas) to maintain that all existents are devoid of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāvatā) since this devoidness of intrinsic nature pervades all existents (bhāva) and is established by the valid means of cognition (pramāṇa). That is exactly why the Blessed One proclaimed as follows:

(139) I.B.2.2. ~ I.B.2.2.3.6. of SDNS (2).
(140) Cf. Māl P198a3-6 D181a6

(kho bo cag kyaṅ tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad ḥo bo ṇid med par sgrub pa yaṅ ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis kyaṅ ma yin no // 'o na ci ḍe na / yaṅ dag pa'i tshad ma ṇid kyis sgrub po //)

(141) BST. No. 2 SRS IX, 47.

svabhāvaṁyāh sada sarvadharmā vastuṁ vibhāventi jināna putrāḥ / sarveṣa sarvāṁ bhāva sarvāṁyāṁ prādeṣikī śūnyatā śūrakānām // 47 //
Māl P. 168a1-2 D155a1-2

'phags pa tiṅ ḍe 'dzin gyi rgyal po las / chos kun rtag tu ḥo bo ṇid kyis ston // rgyal ba'i sras rnams dḥos po rnams pa rjigs / srid pa thams cad rnam pa kun tu ston / 1 ni tshe'i ston ṇid mu stegs can rnams kyi // 1. D has /

MAV P82a8 D81b7—82a1

zla ba sgron ma'i tiṅ ḍe 'dzin las 'di skad du chos rnams thams cad rtag tu raṅ bzin ston // 1 I. P om.
MAP P142a6-7 D132b3-4

rgyal sras rnams kyi 1 ḍhos po rnams bṣig na / srid pa kun ni yohn gis thams cad ston // phyogs gcig ston ṇid mu stegs can rnams kyi // 2 I. D has kyi 2. P has /
All existents are always devoid of intrinsic nature.
Oh, Son of Victor (jina)! All existents are extinct. All transmigratory existences are entirely empty (śūnya).
On the other hand, a heretic asserts that only some existents are empty.

[II. 3.]

[II. 3. 1.]

Then, a contemplator (prekṣāvat) who seeks to remove emotive hindrance (klesāvaraṇa) and intellectual hindrance (jñeyāvaraṇa) must contemplatively practice the path of seeing that all existents are devoid of intrinsic nature, for the hindrance (āvaraṇa) originates in erroneous conception (viparyāsa). That is why all kinds of hindrance would be removed by means of this practice which leads [to the realization] that all existence is devoid of intrinsic nature as opposed to all kinds of erroneous conception (viparyāsa); this is because the source [of inverted conception] is destroyed, as that erroneous conception regarding existence (bhāva), etc., is eliminated. Therefore all kinds of hindrance would be destroyed.

It is also said in the Satyadvayanirdeśa as follows:
“Oh Mañjuśri! How are defilements (klesa) full comprehended? Mañjuśri replied: One conceives by mistake that all existents—which are not arisen (ajāta) and not produced (anuppana) at all from the viewpoint of highest truth (paramārthas)—are nonexistent from the standpoint of conventional truth (saṁvṛtyā). Thought-construction

(142) cf. Māl P274a2-3 D243b2-3

(143) cf. BhK I. P215a3-6

— 63 —
(saṁkalpa) and discrimination (vikalpa) are produced from erroneous conception (viparyāsa). Irrational thought (ayoniṣo-manasikāra) is produced from thought-construction and discrimination. The exaggerating of permanent self (ātma-samāropā) is produced from irrational thought. Delusive view (dṛṣṭi-paryuttāna) is produced from the exaggeration of permanent self. Defilement (kleśa) is produced from obsession. Oh Devaputra! He who completely understands that all existents are not arisen (ajāta), not produced (anutpanna) and non-existent (abhava) is free from erroneous conception from the point of view of highest truth. He who is free from erroneous conception, from the viewpoint of highest truth, is detached from discrimination (avikalpa). He who does not possess discrimination is reasonable (yoniṣa). He who is reasonable does not falsely construct the permanent self. He who does not falsely construct the permanent self does not possess deluded views. Furthermore, he does not possess any deluded views with regard to perfect release (nirvāṇa). Thus, he who abides in non-arising is seen as a person who completely eliminates defilement (kleśa). This is referred to as “abstaining from defilement.” Oh Devaputra! When one comprehends that defilement is completely empty (śūnya), non-existent (abhava) and transitory (anitya) from the viewpoint of highest truth by means of cognition (jñāna) which is devoid of defilement, he arrives at a complete understanding (prajñātā) of defilements (kleśa). Oh Devaputra! Just as a person who fully comprehends the nature of a poisonous snake can suppress its poison, Oh Devaputra!, he who completely understands the nature of defilements, can suppress the defilements. Devaputra asked Mañjuśrī “What is the nature of defilements (kleśa)?” Mañjuśrī replied as follows: It is detailed that the nature of defilements lies in the conceptual construction (kalpanā) with regard to that all existents are completely not arisen, not produced, and not existed from the viewpoint of highest truth. Now, erroneous conception (viparyāsa) with respect to such [categories] as existent (bhāva) pervades all kinds of erroneous conception. Hence it...
follows that all kinds of erroneous conception are renounced when [the former] is removed. That is why an intellectual hindrance (jñeyāvaraṇa) is completely expelled when [erroneous conception with respect to such categories as existent] is removed, for hindrance (āvana) is characterized by erroneous conception as its own nature. Then, the connection (pratibandha) [between cognition and hindrance] does not exist when an intellectual hindrance is removed, hence the intuitive perception without hindrance of a contemplative saint (yogi-pratyakṣa) possesses a ray of wisdom (jñānāloka) that operates everywhere just as a ray of the sun shines in the sky without clouds. The reason is that

(144) BhK I. pp.215-216

— 65 —
cognition (vījñāna) is characterized by its illumination (prakāśa) which is the nature of entities (vastu-svabhāva).

And then, even though [illumination] is placed nearby, an existence is still not illuminated when a connection [between cognition and the hindrance] exists. If there is no connection [between the two], how could all kinds of entities (vastu) not be illuminated as they are since transcendental power is attained. That is why omniscience (saervajñatva) is attained because all kinds of entities are completely known from the standpoint of both conventional and highest truth (saṁvṛti-paramārtha). Accordingly, this path (mārga) is supreme in that omniscience, which removes all hindrance, is attained.

(144a) Māl P274a³—b² D243b³—244a⁵

ji ltaṅ non moṅs pa rnam s yoḥ su sеs pa r 'gyur / 'jam dpal giś smra pa / don dam par chos thams cad śiṅ tu ma skyes śiṅ ma byuṅ ba'i dīnos po dga' / kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa las phyin ci log ste / yod pa ma yin pa las phyin ci log pa de las kun tu rtag pa dahn / rnam par rtag pa 'byuṅ ho / kun tu rtag pa dahn / rnam par rtag pa de las tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa 'byuṅ ho / tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa de las bdag tu sgro 'dogs pa 'byuṅ ho / bdag tu sgro 'dogs pa de las lta ba kun nas dkrīs pa de las non moṅs pa rnam s 'byuṅ ho / lha'i bu gaṅ giś chos thams cad don dam par śiṅ tu ma skyes pa dahn / ma byuṅ bar rab tu śes pa med pa'i tshul giś rab tu śes pa de ni don dam par phyin ci log pa ma yin no / gaṅ žig don dam par phyin ci ma log pa de ni kun tu¹ mi rtag rnam par mi rtag go /² gaṅ mi rtag kun tu mi rtag pa de ni tshul bzin du žugs pa yin no / gaṅ tshul bzin du žugs pa de ni don dam par yod pa ma yin pa la sgro 'dogs pa mi 'gyur ro / gaṅ don dam par yod pa ma yin pa la sgro 'dogs pa mi 'gyur ba de la lta ba kun nas ltaṅ bar mi 'gyur te / don dam par mya han las 'das par lta ba kun nas ltaṅ ba'i bar du yaṅi mi 'gyur ro / skye ba med pa la gnas pa de ŋid kyi non moṅs pa rnam s mthon ba med pa'i tshul giś śiṅ tu mthon bar bta ste / 'di ni ni non moṅs pa 'dul ba žes bya'o /³ lha'i bu gaṅ giś tshe non moṅs pa rnam s snaḥ ba med pa'i śes rab dahn ye śes kyis don dam par śiṅ tu ston pa dahn /⁴ śiṅ tu mtshan ma med pa dahn / don dam par dḥos po rnam s śiṅ tu ma skyes śiṅ ma byuṅ bar rab tu śes pa med pa'i tshul giś⁵ rab tu śes pa de'i tshe lha'i bu non moṅs pa rnam s rab tu śes pa med pa'i tshul giś yohns su śes pa yin no / lha'i bu 'di lta ste dper na gaṅ sbrul giś riṅs 'don pa des ni dagn ži bar byed do / lha'i bu gaṅ žig ni moṅs pa rnam s kyis riṅs rab tu śes pa de ni non moṅs pa rnam s śiṅ tu mi dmigs pa'i tshul giś rab tu ži bar 'gyur ro / lha'i bus smras pa / 'jam dpal non moṅs pa rnam s kyis riṅs gaṅ yin / 'jam dpal giś smras pa / lha'i bu don dam par chos thams cad śiṅ tu ma skyes śiṅ ma byuṅ ba'i dīnos po dag la kun tu rtag pa gaṅ yin pa 'di ni ni non moṅs pa rnam s kyis riṅs yin no žes gaṅ gsuṅs pa yin no / 1. P om. 2. P has / 3. P has / 4. P has / 5. P has/
Therefore, he who wants to attain the stage of omniscience should follow the path of emptiness (śūnyatā) that leads to truth and to wisdom (prajñā) which is combined with skillful means (upāya). He should not follow only one of the two. If he follows only wisdom which is not combined with skillful means, he falls into [the realm of] perfect release (nirvāṇa) in that he actually realizes extinction (nirodha) like the śrāvakas. On the other hand, if he follows only skillful means (upāya), he also falls into the world of transmigration (samsāra) since he holds erroneous conception (viparyāsa). That is why the path of the bodhisattvas is the primary means which leads us to the perfect release that does not cling to the particular nature of skillful means and wisdom, since [bodhisatvas] do not dwell in the world of transmigration by means of wisdom (prajñā) and not enter the peaceful world (nirvāṇa) by virtue of skillful means.

Similarly, it is also declared in the Āryagayāśirṣa as follows:

The path (mārga) of bodhisattvas is summed up as being two-fold: If

(145) BhK II. p65¹⁸-²¹

(146) BhK I. 194¹¹-¹⁵

(145) BhK III. 14¹⁶-­¹⁸

(146) BhK II. 65²²-­²⁴

伽耶山頂經 T14. 485b¹⁴-­¹⁶
[bodhisattvas] achieve two kinds of paths, they can immediately attain supreme enlightenment \((\text{anuttarām samyaksam bodhim})\). Then what are the two? They are wisdom \((\text{prajñā})\) and skillful means \((\text{upāya})\).

In addition, it is also said in the \(\text{Āryavimalakirtinirdeśa}\) as follows:

Wisdom devoid of skillful means and skillful means devoid of wisdom are bondage for \(\text{bodhisattvas}\), whereas wisdom combined with skillful means and skillful means combined with wisdom are a final emancipation \((\text{mokṣatvā})\).

That is why after they have put forth the \(\text{bodhi-citta}\) previously associated with the great compassion \((\text{mahā-karunā})\) towards all sentient beings \((\text{sattva})\), \(\text{bodhisattvas}\) must attain the rank of omniscience \((\text{sarvajñā})\). Accordingly, they must practice and cultivate the practices of wisdom and skillful means such as generosity \((\text{dāna})\) which is thoroughly characterized by the aggregation of moral merit \((\text{punya-sambhāva})\).

\((147)\) BhK I. 194\(^8\)-\(^11\)

\(\text{āryavimalakirtinirdeśe prajñārahitapūpaṇa upāyarahitā ca prajñā bodhi-}
\text{sattvānāṁ bandhanam ity uktam / upāyasahitā prajñā prajñāsahita upāyo}
\text{mokṣatvena varṇitaḥ / BhK III. 22\(^{10}\)-\(^{14}\)}

\(\text{uktam āryavimalakirtinirdeśe copāyād bhavati sarṣūragamanam bodhi-}
\text{sattvānāṁ mokṣāḥ / upāyarahitā ca prajñā bandhaḥ / prajñārahitās copāyō}
\text{bandhaḥ / prajñāsahitā upāyo mokṣāḥ / upāyasahitā prajñā mokṣa iti}
\text{varṇitam / BhK II. 67\(^4\)-\(^{11}\)}

\(\text{’phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa las kyaṅ / byaḥ chubs sens dpa’}
\text{rnams kyi ’chiṅ ba ni gaṅ / thar pa ni gaṅ že na / thabs med par srid pa’i ’gro}
\text{ba yoṅs su ’dzin pa ni byaḥ chub sens dpa’i ’chiṅ ba’o / thabs kyis srid pa’i}
\text{’gro bar ’gro ba ni thar pa’o // thabs kyis ma zin pa’i šes ṛab ni ’chiṅ ba’o //}
\text{thabs kyis zin pa’i šes ṛab ni thar pa’o // šes ṛab kyis ma zin pa’i thabs ni ’chiṅ}
\text{ba’o // šes ṛab kyis zin pa’i thabs ni thar pa’o ŭe rgya cher bka’ stisal to} / \)
\(\text{Āryāvikalpa-praveśa-dhāraṇi-ṭīkā P163b2-3}

\(\text{’phags pa drim med par grags pas bstan pa la sogs pa las kyaṅ / thabs daṅ bral}
\text{ba’i šes rab ’ba’ ŭig ston pa ni byaḥ chub sens dpa’i ’chiṅ ba žes gsuṅs so /}

\((148)\) APDT P163b\(^3\)-\(^4\)

\(\text{de lta bas na byaḥ chub sens dpa dus thams cad du sñīṅ rje chen po sḥon du}
\text{byas la sbyin pa la sogs pa bsod nams daṅ ye šes kyi tshogs sgrub pa la ũes par}
\text{brtson par bya’o /}

---

- 68 -
Then, by removing the two extreme ideas of exaggerating (saṃāropa) and minimizing (apavāda), bodhisattvas proceed upon the middle path (madhyamā pratipad). They do not degenerate into the extreme of exaggeration since they completely comprehend the nature of all kinds of existence as they are. They also do not degenerate into the extreme of minimizing, since according to the tenet of skillful means (upāya) they do not in a nihilistic manner deny such [virtues] as giving (dāna) from the standpoint of conventional truth which possesses all kinds of merit. They abide by [the truth of] emptiness (śūnyatā) in order to expel the wind of erroneous conception (viparyāsa) just as one who is benumbed by a cold wind warms himself at the fire, yet they still do not actually attain [the truth of emptiness].

Likewise, it is also stated in the Ārya-daśadharma-kā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra as follows:

For instance, even if one respects, devotes, honors, reveres, adores, worships and venerates fire, he still does not think that he must grasp fire by his hands just because he honors, reveres, adores, worships and

---

(149) BhK I. p1977-10
anyā ca prajñopāyasya varūpayā pratipadā saṃāropāpavādāntavarjanena 
madhyamā pratipad udbhāvitā / prajñayā saṃāropāntasya varjanād 
upāyenāpavādāntasya varjanāt /

(150) BhK II. p6717-20
de lta bas na lhags pas ŋen pa me la bsten pa bzin du byaḥ chub sems dpas 
phyin ci log gi lhags pa tsam paṅ bā' i phyir thabs daṅ bcas pa'i šes rab kyi stoṅ 
pa ŋid bsten par bya'i / ņan thos bzin du mñon du ni mi bya ste /

(151) BhK II. pp.6720—698
'phags pachos bcu pa'i mdo las ji skad du / rigs kyi bu 'di lta ste / dper na mi 
la la zig me yoṅs su spyod par gyur te / de me de la bsti staṅ byed / bla mar 
byed kyang de 'di sñam du bdag gis me de la bsti staṅ byas / bla mar byas / ri 
mor byas kyang 'di la lag pa gniś kyis yoṅs su gzuṅ bar bya'o sñam du mi sems 
so // de ci'i phyir že na / gzi de las bdag la lus kyi sduṅ bṣañal ba'am / sems kyi 
yid mi bde bar 'gyur du 'oṅ sñam pa'i phyir ro // de bzin du byaṅ chub sems 
dpa' yah mya ņan las 'das pa'i bsam pa can yaṅ yin la mya han las 'das pa 
mñon sum du yaṅ mi byed do // de ci'i phyir že na / gzi de las bdag byaṅ chub 
las phyir ldog par 'gyur du 'oṅ sñam pa'i phyir ro

---
venerate it.

[Objection:] What is the reason?
[Answer:] The reason is that he thinks that his body will suffer from pain and his mind will become uncomfortable if he grasps [the fire]. Similarly, even if bodhisattvas long for, depend upon, fall into and arrive at perfect release (nirvāṇa), they still would not actually attain perfect release.

[Objection:] For what purpose do they do so?
[Answer:] It is because if they do so, they would recede from the supreme enlightenment (bodhi).

We must comprehend clearly the full details of skillful means (upāya) and wisdom (prajñā) [described] in such sūtras as the Aksayamatinirdeśa-sūtra.

[Objection:] In short, what are the skillful means of the bodhisattvas?
[Answer:] “Skillful means (upāya)” signifies that after having understood that all existence is devoid of intrinsic nature by means of wisdom [bodhisattvas] depend upon such [virtues] as generosity (dāna); these virtues are aggregations of all kinds of merit (punya-saṁbhāva) obtained by means of observing sentient beings (sattva) solely with great compassion (mahā-karṇa) and emptiness (śūnyatā)—as if they are an illusion (māyā), etc., and devoid of erroneous conception (aviparyāsa).

Therefore, when [bodhisattva] attains [by means of skillful means (upāya)] the accomplishments of all kinds of prosperity

(152) cf. BhK II. pp.71–73

’phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa las ji skad du / de la byaṅ chub sens dpa’i thabs ni gaṅ / šes rab mḥon par sgrub pa ni gaṅ že na / gaṅ gi phyir mṅam par gzag pa na sens can la lta bas na sṅiṅ rje chen po’i dmigs pa la sens ņe bar ’jog pa de ni de’i thabs so // gaṅ gi phyir ži ba daṅ rab tu ži bar sṅoms par ’jug pa de ni de’i šes rab bo
An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśīla’s *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

(*abhyudaya*)—great enjoyment (*mahā-bhoga*), Buddha land (*kṣetra*), [salvation for] the world of transmigration (*saṁsāra*) and physical body (*rūpa-kāya*), etc., of the Tathāgata,—he remains [in this world] to lead all sentient beings in the various transmigratory states (*gati*) to all kinds of welfare (*hita*) and happiness (*sukha*). That is why a contemplator (*prekṣavat*) should make every endeavor to achieve virtue (*guṇa*) after having developed pure confidence (*prasāda*) in the Buddha.

II. 4.

Thus in expounding the middle way, I attain moral merit (*puṇya*), by which I hope that all sentient beings of the various transmigrating states (*gati*) will attain the middle way. He who is not filled with virtue (*guṇa*) is just like a lake without water. Sages who have removed the

(153) cf. BhK I. p1973-6

(154) BhK III. pp3014—31

---

- 71 -
defilement of envy attain the true teaching just as a delighted swan selects milk from water. Therefore, after carefully selecting without failure the essence of the true teaching from mixture [of various teachings], sages must discard false teachings like poison.

The *Sarvadharmanihsvabhāvasiddhi* which has been composed by Ācārya-Kamalaśīla is completed. This is translated, revised and edited by Śilendrabodhi, an Indian scholar and dPal brtsegs rakṣita, a great editor.
An Annotated Translation of Kamalāśīla's *Sarvadharmniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

III. Tibetan Text of the *Sarvadharmniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalāśīla Part IV.

P330a³
D286a⁵
C283a⁶
N316a⁵

[II.] [II. 1.] [II. 2.]

de ni luṅ gis kyaṅ bṣrgb par bya ste / de la glaṅ po rtsal gyi mdo las / gaṅ la skye ba srid pa yi / ḍnos po 'ga' yaṅ mi rṇed do /raṅ bżin med pa'i ḍnos rṃns la // byis pa dag ni skye(1) bar 'dod // ces gsuṅs so //

'phags pa dkon(2) mchog 'byuṅ gnas kyi mdo las kyaṅ / gaṅ la raṅ o'bżin yod(3) pa ma yin(4) pa // raṅ bżin med de gzan rkyen ji ltar 'gyur // raṅ bżin med pas gzan ci skyed 'gyur žes // rgyu de de bżin gšegs pas bstan pa yin // žes gsuṅs(7) so //

**N316b**

klu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos žus pa'i mdo** las kyaṅ / sṅoṅ gyi mtha' ston phyi ma'i mtha' ston žiṅ /(8) skye daṅ 'jig daṅ gnas pa'i ḍnos po ston // 'di ni ḍnos min* ḍnos po med pa'aṅ min // chos rṇms thams cad raṅ gi ŋo bos ston // žes gsuṅs so //

'phags pa tiṅ ņe 'dzin gyi rgyal po'i(10) mdo las kyaṅ / dper na chu śiṅ rlom(11) pa'i sdoṅ po la(12) // sṅiṅ po 'dod mis rṇam par bšig na yaṅ // phyi daṅ naṅ na sṅiṅ po med pa ltar // chos (P) rṇms thams cad de 'drar šes par gyis // žes(16) gsuṅs so... //

'phags pa sāṅs rgyas kyis yaṅ dag par sdud pa las kyaṅ / tshul bżin 'dri ba ni gaṅ lags / tshul ma lags pa ni gaṅ lags / bka' stsal pa / skye ba med pa ni tshul yin te / de 'dri ba ni tshul bżin 'dri ba'o žes(17... gsuṅs so... // yaṅ de ŋīd las chos thams cad ni tsa žes bya(18) ba'i sgo can te(19) / 'chi 'pho daṅ

| (1) P has *skyā* | (8) C N have // | (15) N has / |
| (2) P has *dkan* | (9) P N have / | (16) N has *gsuṅso* |
| (3) P has *yad* | (10) P N have *po* | (17) N has *gsuṅso* |
| (4) P has *ya na* | (11) P D have *rlom* | (18) C has *byad* |
| (5) N has / | (12) D C have *las* | (19) P D N have *ste* |
| (6) P N have / | (13) P D N have / | |
| (7) N has *gsuṅ* | (14) P D N have / | |

— 73 —
skye ba dañ bral ba (20)...yin no...20) // chos thams cad ni rañ bžin gyi sgo can te / rañ bžin ni stoñ pa ñid kyi phyir ro žes gsuñs so //

_yab dañ sras mjäl ba'i mdo_ las kyañ / chos 'di dag thams cad ni dus gsum mña ma pa ñid kyis mña ma pa ste / 'das pa'i dus na yañ chos thams cad rañ bžin dañ bral ba yin la / ma 'oñs pa dañ da ltar byuñ ba'i dus su yañ chos thams cad rañ bžin dañ bral ba yin no žes gsuñs šiñ / yañ de ñid las / chos thams cad ni rañ bžin gyis stoñ(21) pa'o // rañ bžin med pa'i chos gañ yin pa de ni 'das pa ma yin / (22) ma 'oñs pa ma yin / (23) da ltar byuñ ba ma yin // (24) de ci'i phyir že na / rañ bžin med pa'i phyir 'das pa žes gdags par bya ba ma yin / ma 'oñs pa žes gdags par bya ba ma yin / da ltar byuñ ba žes gdags par bya ba ma yin no žes gsal bar mdzad do //

*C284a* 'phags pa bden pa gñis la 'jug pa las kyañ / 'jam dpal $*$ yañ dag pa'i sbyor ba gañ yin / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa lha'i bu don dam par de bžin ñid dañ / chos kyi dbyiins dañ / (P) šin tu skye ba med pa gañ dañ mña ma pa mtshams med pa rñasms kyañ de dañ mña ma mo žes kun nas ſon moñs pa dañ / rnam par byañ ba'i chos thams cad rgyas par bśad pa dañ / smras pa / 'jam dpal gžon nur gyur pa mña ma pa ñid gañ gis rnam par byañ ba'i bar gañ dañ mña ma pa chos thams cad kyañ de dañ mña ma / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / lha'i bu don dam par chos thams cad skye ba med par mña ma pa ñid dañ / *don dam par chos thams cad šin tu skye ba med par mña ma pa ñid dañ / don dam par chos thams cad diños po med par mña ma pa ñid kyis chos thams cad mña ma mo žes rgya cher gsuñs so// 'phags pa sañs rgyas thams cad kyi ye šes snañ ba'i rgyan las kyañ / skye(25) med chos ni rtag tu de bžin gšegs // chos rñasms thams cad bde bar gšegs dañ 'dra // byis pa'i blo can

---

(20) N has _yino_  
(21) P N have _stoñs_  
(22) D C om.  
(23) D om.  
(24) P N have /  
(25) C has _skye pa_
An Annotated Translation of Kamalaśila’s *Sarvādharmāniśvabhāvasiddhi* Part IV.

mtshan mar 'dzin pa yis // 'jig rten na ni med pa'i chos la spyod // ces gsuns so //

'phags pa ʾses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las kyaṅ // (25a) rab 'byor raṅ gi mtshan ŋid stoṅ pa ŋid kyi phyir / gzugs nas rnam par šes pa'i bar du raṅ gi Ṉo bos stoṅ Ḇo žes gsuṅs so //
dkon mchog za ma tog // (26) las kyaṅ / 'jam dpal (27... de ci'i...27) phyir saṅs rgyas kyi chos kyaṅ chos ma yin nam / btsun pa rab 'byor saṅs rgyas kyi chos rnam la yaṅ dag par grub pa 'ga' yaṅ med do // gaṅ grub pa med pa (28) de ni chos kyaṅ ma yin // chos ma yin pa yaṅ ma yin no // (29) žes brjod par bya ste / de** Ita bas (P) na bcom ldan 'das ŋid kyi chos thams cad  ni chos ma yin pa (30) žes gsuṅs so //

[II. 2. A.] [II. 2. A. 1.] [II. 2. A. 1. 1.]
gal te 'di thams cad ni kun brtags pa'i ņo bo ŋid las dgoṅs nas gsuṅs pa yin te / mdo las ji skad du / kun brtags pa'i ņo bo ŋid las dgoṅs nas chos thams cad ņo bo ŋid med par bstan to žes gruṅs pa Ita bu'o že na / O'di ni bden pa ņid na 'on kyaṅ kun brtags pa'i ņo bo ņid 'di gaṅ yin žes bya ba 'di brjod dgos so //
gal te gaṅ tshad mas gnod bžin du byis pa rnam kyis de kho na ņid bzuṅ ba yin no že na ni
gal te de Ita na ni sgyu ma bžin du ma brtags na dga' ba rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'buyn ba'i dños po thams cad la byis pa rnam kyis don dam par skye ba la sogs par sgro 'dogs pa gaṅ yin pa de ņid tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir kun brtags pa'i bdag ŋid yin te / sñar ji skad du bṣad pa yin no // de Ita ma yin na ni phyi rol gyi don yaṅ kun brtags pa'i ņo bo ņid kyis stoṅ pa'i phyir don dam par yod pa ņid du ci'i phyir mi bzuṅ / ci ste de (31) tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir don dam par yod pa ņid du mi

---

(25a) N has // (28) P C N have *med pa* (31) C om.
(26) C has *rtog* (29) D C om.
(27) D C have *de'i* (30) D C have *pa'o*
D287b  gzuñ na ni gal te de lta na skye ba la so gs pa yañ tshad mas* gnod pa'i phyir de bžin du gzuñ bar mi bya'o //
gal te skye ba la so gs pa grags pa yin pa'i phyir tshad mas
gnod par bya ba mi nus so že na ma yin te / don dam par ni
ma yin gyi / kun rdzob tu grags pa'i phyir ji ltar sñar
dpyad(32) pa bžin no //
bc om ldan 'das kyis kyañ / (33) dños rnams skye ba kun rbzob
tu // de ni yañ dag kun rdzob 'dod // (34) ces (P) gsuñs so
// de lta ma yin na phyi rol gyi don yañ grags pa'i tshad mas

P332a  gnod par mi 'gyur ro // * de lta bas na tshad mas grags pa'i
grags pa gañ yin pa(35) de kho na rigs pa yin gyi / ɡžan ni ma
yin no //

de bas na bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa dgoñs pa,ñes par
'grel ba la so gs pa las / 耵 bo ɲid rnam pa gsum ni ɲas chos
chos thams cad ɲo bo ɲid med pa rnam pa gsum las dgoñs
nas ɲo bo ɲid rnam pa gsum mo žes bstan pa gañ yin pa de
dañ yañ mi 'gal ba ɲid de / 'dir yañ ɲo bo ɲid gsum rnam par
bžag(36) pa 'gal(37) ba med pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar ma brtags
par grags pa dños po rnams kyi rten(38) ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ
ba'i ɲo bo ɲid gañ yin pa de ni ɡžan gyi dbañ gi ɲo bo ɲid de
/ kun rdzob tu sgyu ma la so gs pa bžin du rkyen gyi dbañ gis
skye bas ɲo bo ɲid med pa'i phyir skye ba ɲo bo ɲid med pa
yin no //

*C285a  de la don dam par skye ba la so gs pa'i ɲo bor sgro 'dogs 护肤品 pa
gañ yin pa de ni kun brtags pa'i ɲo bo ɲid de / de yañ tshad
mas ji ltar rnam par brtags pa bžin ɲo bo ɲid ma grub pa'i
phyir mtshan ɲid ɲo bo ɲid med pa yin no // (39) ɡžan gyi
dbañ la ji skad bšad pa'i kun brtags pa'i ɲo bo ɲid kyis stoñ

(32) D C have spyad
(33) P N om.
(34) P D N have /
(35) D C have pas
(36) D C have ɡžag
(37) P C have bgal
(38) D C have byed
(39) C has /
pa gan yin pa de ni yoñs su grub pa'i no bo ñid de / de ni tshad mas yañ dag par grub pa ñid du rtag tu grub pa'i phyir ro // de yañchos thams cad la khyab par byed pa ñid kyi spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi spyin pa'ai phyir don dam pa no bo ñid med pa yin (P) pas 'dir yañ thams cad mi(40) 'gal ba kho na'o/

skye ba dañ 'gag pa la sogs pa la mñon par žen pa'i gdul bya(41) la chad(42) par lta ba yoñs pa spañ ba'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyi 'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel ba la sogs pa las* rnam par šes pa la sogs pa yod pa ñid du bstan(43) pa gan yin pa de yañ don** dam par ma yin no çes bya bar gzuñ bar bya ste /

'phags pa chos yañ dag par sduñ pa las / ji skad du rigs kyi bu 'jig rten gnas pa ni skye ba dañ 'gag pa la mñon par žen pa yin te / de la de bžin gñegs pa thugs rje chen po can gyis 'jig rten gyi skrag(44) pa'i gnas yoñs su spañ ba'i phyir tha sñad kyi dbañ gis skye ba(45) 'gag go çes gsuñs par zad kyi / 'di la chos 'ga' yañ skye ba med do çes gsuñs pa lta bu'o // de lta bas na luñ las kyañ / chos thams cad don dam par no bo ñid(46) med do çes bya bar grub po // des na dños po dag la don dam par(47) skye ba la sogs par mñon par žen pa ni phyin ci log yin la / de las bñuñg pa mñon par ma žen pa ni phyin ci ma log pa çes bya ba 'di rnam par gnos so //

[I. 2. A. 1. 2.]
thog ma med pa'i srid par 'byuñ ba'i dños po mñon par žen pa'i gdon gyis brlams pa kha cij gyis kun r dzob dañ don dam pa'i mtshan ñid phyin ci ma log par bstan pa'ai phyir 'di skad du /

gan la bcom dañ blo yis gżan // bstsal(48) na de'i bo mi 'byuñ

(40) P N have ma (43) D has brtan (46) D C have med don
(41) P N have ba (44) P N have bkag (47) P N have pa
(42) D C have khyad (45) P N have bo (48) D C have btsal

— 77 —
ba // bum chu sogs bzin kun rdzob tu // (49) yod de don dam yod gzan no // zes bsad pa gant yin pa de phyin ci ma log par ston par nus pa ma yin te // 'di ltar gzan dag gis bum pa la sogs pa yan lag (P)° can nid du kun brtags pa rnams kun rdzob pa nid du bsgrub pa'i phyir bsad pa gant yin pa gal te bum pa la sogs pa gant yin pa de dag don dam par yod na ci'i phyir de dag bcom na(50) de'i blo mi 'byuñ zhes bya ba de ni ma(51) nes pa yin no // 'di ltar bcag na zhes bya ba zig na zhes bya ba'i don yin par brjod par 'dod na ni de'i tshe de nid ma yin pa nid kyi phyir de dag la de lta bu'i blo mi 'byuñ bar zad kyi / brdzun pa'i phyir ni ma yin no ** zhes bya bar yañ srid do//

'on te cha šas su bšig na zhes bya ba'i don yin na ni de'i tshe yan lag ldan pa zig yin pa dañ / yan lag can zig yin pa'ai phyir de lta bu'i blo mi 'byuñ no zhes bya bar yañ dogs so // blos gzan bsal(52) na zhes pa de yañ ha cañ khyab ches pa'ai phyir mtshan nid ma yin pa nid de / ji ste bum pa la sogs pa blos rnam par gzigs(53) na / cha šas kyis no bo nid don* dam pa pa nes pa mi ŋin pa ltar rdul phra rab dag dañ rnams par šes pa yañ de dañ 'dra bas de dag kyañ kun rdzob nid du thal bar 'gyur ro // (54) ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams lus can yin pa'i gdon mi za bar phyogs cha(55) tha dad par khas blañ dgos so // de lta ma yin na šar dañ byañ la sogs pa'i phyogs cha tha dad par gnas med pa'ai phyir ri la sogs pa(56) bsags par mi 'gyur ro // de lta bas na bsags pa'i no bo ŋid kyi phyir phyogs cha tha dad pas tha dad pa 'di dag cha šas gsal(56a) ba byas na bum pa la sogs pa bzin du ŋo bo ŋid ŋes par mi zin pa'ai phyir kun rdzob pa kho (P) nar 'gyur ro //

(49) C has /  (53) D C have bžigs  (56a) All has bsal but reform it to gsal
(50) P N have pa  (54) C has /
(51) C has yin  (55) P N om.
(52) C has btsal  (56) D om.
An Annotated Translation of Kamalāśīla’s *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhavasiddhi* Part IV.

[II. 2. A. 2.]

**nīd du khaś bhaś** (57) dgos te / ṣes pa ni thams cad du rtog pa’i nö bo (58) nīd du mtshuṅs pa’i phyir rnam pa med pa yin yaṅ yul ’dzin par (59) *rnam par gţag* (59) pa so sor nes pa mi ruṅ ba’i phyir ro //

[II. 2. A. 3.]

de’ī phyir phyi rol gyi don bžin du ṣes pa sna tshogs kyi nö bo nīd yin pa’i phyir sna tshogs kyi rnam pa re re nas btsal (60) yaṅ no bo nīd ’ga’ yaṅ mi zin pa’i phyir kun rdzob pa nīd du ’gyur ro // de lta na ni kun rdzob pa’i mtshan nīd ’dis dṇos po thams cad gsal ba kho nar kun rdzob kyi nö bor bsgrub (61) pa’i phyir kho bo cag gi lta ba kho na gzhūn btsugs par ’gyur te / de skad du ’phags** pa (62) *laṅ kar* (62) *gţęgs pa’i mdo* las / (63) blo yis o’rnam par gţıgs (64) rnam kyi // nö bo nīd ni nes mi zin // de phyir de dag brjod med daṅ // nö bo nīd ni nes par bstan // žes (65) gsuṅs so //

[II. 2. B.] [II. 2. B. 1.]

gţan dag na re don bya ba byed nus pa’i don de ni don dam par yod kyi / gţan du ni kun rdzob tu yod pa’o žes zer te / de ’dir gal te yaṅ dag pa’i kun rdzob la brten nas byis pa rnam gsuṅ (66) ba’i don dam par yod pa’i mtshan nīd du brjod na ni de’ī tshe ’di rigs pa yin no // de nīd kyi phyir de las ji lta ba de ltar yod du zad mod ces bṣad do //

[II. 2. B. 2.]

’on te gcig kho nar don dam par yod pa’i mtshan nīd yin no že na / de’ī tshe don dam par dṇos po thams cad kyi don bya ba (67)

---

(57) D C have *blaṅs*  
(58) P om.  
(59) P N have *bţag*  
(60) D has *bṛtsal*  
(61) P N have *bsgrubs*  
(62) P has *laṅkar*  
(63) D has //  
(64) P N have *bţıgs*  
(65) P N have *ces*  
(66) P N have *bzuṅ*  
(67) P N have *bar*
byed pa ñid ma grub pa'i phyir ji ltar sñar dpyad bžin no // de'i phyir mtshan ñid mi srid pa can yin no // gžan dag na re (P) šes pa la gzun ba dañ 'dzin pa'i rnam pas stoñ pa ñid ni de kho na yin no // gnis po ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o žes zer te / 'di ltar gal te med pa'i ño bo stoñ pa ñid brjod par 'dod na ni /\(^{(68)}\) de med pa ni de kho na ñid yin no //

[II. 2. B. 2. 1.]
*D289a* 'on te ma yin * pa'i ño bo ñid yin na de'i tshe gnis su snañ ba las (69) ma gtogs pa šes pa'i ño bo gžan tshad mas ma grub pa'i phyir /\(^{(70)}\) 'di ni de kho na ñid ston par nus pa ma yin no //

[II. 2. B. 2. 2.]
ci ste gal te rnam par šes pa gnis su med pa'i mtshan ñid don dam par yod pa ma yin na / de'i tshe gnis su snañ ba'i rgyu ci žig yin par 'gyur sñam du sems na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / de dañ der lhan cig 'brel par\(^{(71)}\) ma grub pa'i phyir ro // gnis dañ gnis su med pa ni lhan cig de'i bdag ñid kyis 'brel pa yañ med de / bden pa dañ bden pa ma yin pa dag ni phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyis 'gal ba'i phyir ro //

[II. 2. B. 2. 3.]
de las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid kyañ ** ma yin te / bden pa ma yin pa ni\(^{(72)}\) gañ las kyañ 'byuñ bar mi srid pa'i phyir dper na ri boñ gi rva lta bu'o // de lta ma yin na 'di gžan gyi dbañ gi ño bo kho nar 'gyur gyi / kun brtags pa ni ma yin no // de ñid kyi phyir rnam par šes pa dañ 'brel ba med na ri boñ gi rva bžin te snañ bar mi 'gyur ro // gžan yañ gal te gnis po ma gtogs pa rnam par šes pa'i rañ bžin gžan žig yin gyi /\(^{(73)}\) gnis po ni ma yin pa ñid yin na ni de'i tshe gnis po bdag ñid snañ bar mi (P) 'gyur te / šes

\[^{(68)}\) D C om. \(^{(69)}\) P N have la instead of las \(^{(70)}\) D C om. \(^{(71)}\) D C have pa \(^{(72)}\) P N om. \(^{(73)}\) D C om.
An Annotated Translation of Kamalasila's *Sarvadharmanihsvabhavasiddhi* Part IV.

pa'i raṅ gi ṅo bo ma yin pa'i phyir ro // rnam par šes pa raṅ gi ṅo bo ni 'di kho na yin te / gaṅ C286b bdag ŋid gsal bar bya ba'i phyir gsal ba gzan la mi l토s(74) la / gsal bar ma byas par yaṅ mi 'dug ste / nam mkha'i(75) ŋos daṅ mar me'i sñiṅ po'i 'od bzin no // gñis po yaṅ de daṅ 'dra bas 'di šes pa'i ṅo bo ma yin par mi rigs so // gñis po šes pa'i ṅo bor gyur pa de yaṅ brdzun pa yin na ni šes pa ŋid brdzun pa yin no ŋes gsal rab tu smras par 'gyur ro//

[II. 2. B. 2. 4.]
gzan yaṅ šes pa gñis su med pa'i ṅo bo bden žes bya ba gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ re žig rtag pa'i ṅo bo ŋid du rigs pa yin te / sīar rtag pa'i dños po rgyas par bsal(76) ba'i phyir ro // rtag pa ni khyad par du byar med pa'i phyir rnal 'byor goms pa la sogs pas cuṅ zad kyaṅ mi byed las thar pa don du gñer ba rnams kyis 'bad pa don med par 'gyur ro //

[II. 2. B. 2. 5.]
don dam par ni mi rtag par yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te / de rgyu daṅ bcas pa daṅ rgyu med par skye ba bkag pa'i phyir la / ma skyes pa(77) ni mi rtag par(78) yin par rigs pa ma yin pas so //

[II. 2. B. 2. 6.]
*D289b* dños po'i ṅo bo gzan yaṅ yod * pa ma yin te /

[II. 2. B. 2. 7.]
**N320b* des na ṅo bo ŋid med pa ŋid kyis dños po thams cad la ** khyab pa'i phyir daṅ(79) tshad mas grub pa'i phyir don dam par rigs so // de ŋid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'daś kyis / chos kun rtag tu ṅo bo ŋid kyis stoṅ // rgyal ba'i sras rnams dños po rnam

---

(74) P N have *bltos*  
(75) N has *kha'i*  
(76) P N have *gsal*  
(77) D C have *par*  
(78) D C have *pa*  
(79) D C om.
par 'byed // srid pa thams cad rnam pa kun tu stoṅ // ŋi tshe
stoṅ pa mu stegs can rnm kyi // 'žes gsuṅs so //

[II. 3.] [II. 3. 1.]

P335a de lta na ŋon moṅs pa daṅ śes (P) bya'i sgrīb pa span bar 'dod pa rtog pa daṅ ldam pas chos thams cad ŋo bo ŋid med pa'i lam 'di kho na bsgom par bya ste / sgrīb pa'i rtṣa ba ni phyin ci log yin pa'i phyir la / phyin ci log thams cad daṅ 'gal ba'i rnam pa can chos thams cad ŋo bo ŋid med pa la goms pa 'dis kyan (84) dños po la sog pa phyin ci log spoṅ bas rtṣa ba bcad pa'i phyir sgrīb pa thams cad spoṅ bar 'gyur ba ŋid do //
de skad du 'phags pa bden pa gñis bstan pa las kyan / 'jam dpal ji ltar na ŋon moṅs pa (85—yoṅs su—85) śes par 'gyur / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / don dam pa ṣin tu ma skyes śiṅ ma byuṅ ba'i dños po dag la kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa las phyin ci log de yod de ma yin pa las phyin ci log pa de las kun tu rtog pa daṅ rnam par rtog pa 'byuṅ ŋo // kun tu rtog pa daṅ rnam par rtogs pa de las tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa 'byuṅ ŋo // tshul bzin ma yin pa'i yid la byed pa de las bdag tu sgro 'dogs pa

°C287a 'byuṅ ŋo // bdag tu sgro 'dogs ○ pa las lta ba kun nas ldaṅ ŋo // lta ba kun nas ldam ba de las ŋon moṅs pa rnm 'byuṅ ŋo // lha'i bu gaṅ dag gis chos thams cad don dam par śin tu ma skyes pa daṅ / (86) ma byuṅ ba'i dños po mthoṅ ba de ni don dam par phyin ci ma log pa yin no // gaṅ žig gis don dam par phyin ci ma log pa de ni kun tu mi rtog (87) rnam par mi ** rtog go // (88) gaṅ kun tu mi rtog rnam par mi rtog pa de ni tshul bzin

**N321a du žugs pa yin no // gaṅ (P) tshul bzin du žugs pa de ni bdag tu sgro 'dogs par mi 'gyur ro // gaṅ bdag tu sgro 'dogs par mi 'gyur ba de la ni lta ba kun nas ldam bar mi 'gyur te / don dam par mya ŋan las 'das par lta ba kun nas ldaṅ ba'i bar du yaṅ mi

P335b du tugs pa yin no // gaṅ (P) tshul bzin du žugs pa de ni bdag tu sgro 'dogs par mi 'gyur ro // gaṅ bdag tu sgro 'dogs par mi 'gyur ba de la ni lta ba kun nas ldam bar mi 'gyur te / don dam par

(80) P N have tse
(81) P N om.
(82) D C have rtogs
(83) P N have srid
(84) P N have /
(85) N has yoṅsu
(86) D C om.
(87) P N have pa
(88) P C N have /
'gyur ro // skye ba med pa la gnas pa'i de ŋid kyi ŋon moṅs pa śin tu rnam par gdul bar lta ste / 'di ŋon moṅs pa 'dul ba žes bya'o // lha'i bu gaṅ gi tshe ŋon moṅs pa(89) snaṅ ba med par śes pas don dam par śin tu stoṅ pa daṅ / mtshan ma med pa /(90) * śin tu dños po med par rab tu śes pa de'i tshe (91) lha'i bu ŋon moṅs pa rñams (92...yohns su...92) śes pa yin no // lha'i bu 'di lta ste dper na(93) gaṅ sbrol gyi rigs 'don pa des ni sbrol de'i dug ži bar byed do // lha'i bu de bžin du gaṅ žig ŋon moṅs pa rñams kyi rigs 'don pa de'i ŋon moṅs pa rñams rab tu ži bar 'gyur ro // lha'i bus smras pa / 'jam dpal ŋon moṅs pa rñams kyi rigs gaṅ yin / 'jam dpal gyis smras pa / lha'i bu chos thams cad kyi dños po śin tu ma skyes śin ma byuṅ ba dag la(94) kun tu rtog pa gaṅ yin pa 'di ni ŋon moṅs pa rñams kyi rigs yin no žes rgyas par gsuṅs so // dños po la sogṣ pa(95) phyin ci log pas kyan phyin ci log thams cad la khyab pā'i phyir. (96...spanš na...96) phyin ci log thams cad spanš pas śes bya'i sgrib pa yaṅ 'dis legs par spoṅ bar 'gyur te / sgrib pa ni phyin ci log gi mtshan ŋid yin pa'i phyir ro // śes bya'i sgrib pa spanš na gags byed pa med pa'i phyir sbrin la sogṣ pa'i sgrib pa daṅ bral ba'i nam mkha' la ŋi ma'i 'od zer bžin du (97) thams cad (P) thog pa med pa'i śes ** pa'i snaṅ ba 'jug ste / 'di ltar rnam par par śes pa ni dños po'i raṅ gi ŋo bo gsal ba'i ņo bo yin la /(98) de yaṅ ņe ba'i phyir ro // gags byed pa yod na ni dños po gsal bar mi 'gyur ba žig na / gags byed pa med pa yin na go mtu'i khyad par bsam gyis mi khyab pa brṅes pa'i phyir ci'i phyir dños po thams cad ji lta ba bžin du gsal bar mi 'gyur / de'i phyir ○ dños po thams cad ji lta ba bžin du kun rdzob daṅ (99) don dam pa'i ņo bor (100...yohns su...100) mkhyen pa'i phyir thams cad mkhyen pa ŋid thob bo // de'i
phyir sgrib pa span bar bya ba la lam 'di kho na dam pa yin no //

[II. 3.2.]
de lta bas na thams cad mkhen pa'i go 'phañ thob par 'dod pas stoñ pa ņid kyi lam 'di kho na thabs dañ ldan pa'i śes rab kyis bsten\(^{(101)}\) par bya'o // 'ba' ŋig gis ni ma yin te / thabs med pa'i śes rab 'ba' ŋig gis bsten\(^{(102)}\) na ņan thos bžin du 'gog pa mñoñ sum du byas pa'i phyir mya ņan las 'das par lhuñ la / thabs tsam bsten\(^{(103)}\) pas kyañ phyin ci log tu gyur pa'i phyir 'khor bar lhuñ ņo // de'i phyir śes rab kyi stobs kyis 'khor ba la mi gnas pa'i phyir dañ / thabs kyi stobs kyis mya ņan las 'das par mi 'jug pa'i phyir byañ chub sms dpa' rnams kyi la thabs dañ śes rab kyi ņo bo ni\(^{(104)}\) mi gnas pa'i mya ņan las 'das pa thob pa'i rgyu yin no //

*D290b* de skad du 'phags pa ga ya go\(^{(105)}\) ri las kyañ / *lam gañ dag dañ ldan na byañ chub sms dpa' rnams myur du bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs pa'i (P) byañ chub mñoñ par rdzogs par 'tshañ rgya bar 'gyur ba byañ chub sms dpa' rnams kyi lam mdor bstan pa gños po 'di dag ste / gños gañ že na /\(^{(106)}\) 'di lta ste / śes rab dañ thabs so žes gsuñs so //

P336b

**N322a** 'phags pa dri ma med par grags pas\(^{(107)}\)** bstan pa las kyañ /thabs dañ bral ba'i śes rab ni byañ chub sms dpa' rnams kyi 'čhiñ ba'o // śes rab dañ bral ba'i thabs kyañ 'čhiñ ba'o // śes rab dañ bcas pa'i thabs ni thar ba'o\(^{(108)}\) / thabs dañ bcas pa'i śes rab kyañ thar ba'o žes gsugs so // de'i phyir byañ chub kyi sms sms can thams cad la sňiñ rje chen po sňon du 'gro ba can bskyed de / thams cad mkhyen pa'i go 'phañ thob par bya ba'i phyir śes rab dañ thabs te / sbyin pa la sogs pa bsod nams kyi tshogs kyi mtshan ņid thams cad la goms par bya'o // de lta na byañ chub

---

\(^{(101)}\) D C have *brten* \(^{(104)}\) D C om. \(^{(107)}\) D C have *par*

\(^{(102)}\) D C have *brten* \(^{(105)}\) D C have *mgo* \(^{(108)}\) D has pa'o

\(^{(103)}\) D C have *brten* \(^{(106)}\) D C om.
sems dpa' sgro 'dogs pa dañ (109) skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' spañs nas dbu ma'i lam la žugs pa yin te / šes rab kyi dños po thams cad kyi rañ bžin ji lta ba bžin yoñs su šes pa'i phyir sgro 'dogs pa'i mthar yañ mi lhuñ la / thabs bstan pas ni kun (110) tu sbyin pa la sogs pa bsod nams thams cad la skur pa mi 'debs pa'i phyir skur pa'i mthar yañ mi lhuñ ņo // lhags pas ſam thag pas me bžin du phyin ci log gi lhags pa bsal ba'i phyir stoñ pa ſid bsten (111) par bya ba 'ba' žig tu zad kyi / mñoñ sum du (P) byed pa ni ma yin te / ji skad du chos bcu pa'i mdo las / 'di lta ste dper na / skyes bu žig me la bkur sti ○ byed par gyur la / (112) me de la gus par byed / bla mar byed / mgu bar byed / mchod par byed / legs par bkur sti byed kyañ / (114) de 'di sñañ du bdag gis me 'di la gus par byas / bla mar byas / mgu bar byas / mchod par byas / bkur sti byas pa lag pa gñis kyis 'di gzuñ bar byao sñañ du mi sems so / de ci'i phyir že na / de'i gži las bdag gi lus kyi sdug bsñal dañ / sems ** kyi yid mi bde bar 'gyur du 'oñ ſno sñañ mo / de bžin du byañ chub sems dpa' yañ mya ſan las (115) 'das pa la sems pa dañ / mya ſan las 'das pa la gžol ba dañ / mya ſan las 'das pa la 'bab pa dañ / mya ſan las 'das pa la bab pa yin yañ / mya ſan las 'das pa mñoñ * sum du mi byed do / de ci'i phyir že na / bdag 'di'i gži las byañ chub las ldog par 'gyur du 'oñ ſno sñañ mo// thabs dañ šes rab dag rgyas par ni / blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa la sogs pa las ſes par gzuñ bar byao / mdor na byañ chub sems dpa'i thabs ni gañ / šes rab kyis (P) chos thams cad rañ bžin med pa ſnid du rtogs par byas nas sgyu ma la sogs pa bžin du phyin ci ma log pa ſnid sñiñ rje chen po dañ / stoñ pa ſnid kho na yod pa'i sems can la lta bas sbyin pa la sogs pa bsod nams kyi tshogs thams cad la brten (116) pa 'di kho na yin no // des na de bžin gšegs pa'i loñs spyod chen po žiñ dañ / 'khor dañ /
gzugs kyi sku la sogs pa mñon par\(^{(117)}\) mtho ba phun sum
tshogs pa la sogs pa thams cad 'thob na 'khor ba ji srid par 'gro
ba ma lus pa phan pa dañ // bde ba'i rnam pa thams cad bsgru
ba cin gnas pas rtog pa dañ ldan pas sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das
la dañ ba ŋe bar bsksyed nas / de'i yon tan ŋe bar yoŋs su grub
par bya ba'i phyir 'bad par bya'o//

[II. 4.]
de ltar bdag gis dbu ma'i lam // rab tu gsal byas bsod nams gañ
// thob pa de yis 'gro ba gañ // dbu ma'i lam 'di thob par šog /
chu yis mtsho ltar yon tan mi ņoms šin // phrag dog la sogs dri
ma spañ\(^{(118)}\) mkhas rnam s // ņañ pa rab dga' chu las\(^{(119)}\) 'o ma
bžin // rnam par phye nas legs par bšad rnam s (P) len // de lta
P338a
**N323a ** bas na mkhas rnam s kyis // 'dres pa las ni legs bšad pa'i //
sniŋ po skyon med kun blaŋ źin // ņes bšad dug bžin dor bar
bya //
chos thams cad raň bžin med pa ŋid du grub pa //\(^{(120)}\) slob dpòn
ka ma la ši las mdzod pa rdzogs so // rgya gar gyi mkhan po
ši lendra bo dhi dañ / ŋu chen gi lo tsä\(^{(121)}\) ba dge sloň dpal
brtseg s raksi tas bsgru cin Žug te gtan la phab pa'o\(^{(122)}\) //

---

\(^{(117)}\) P C have pa  
\(^{(119)}\) P N have la  
\(^{(120)}\) P N have tsatsha
\(^{(118)}\) P N have spañ  
\(^{(121)}\) D C have /  
\(^{(122)}\) D has pa

---

25 January 1984  
Department of Oriental Languages  
University of California, Berkely